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This report explores the emergence of Building the Bridge, an organisation that was established to 
implement the previous Government’s Prevent agenda. Commentators have argued that the city of 
Bristol managed to turn the implementation of Prevent into a genuine collaboration between public 
authorities and Bristol’s Muslim communities, which manifested itself in the re-branding of Prevent 
as ‘Building the Bridge’. Building the Bridge emerged as a participatory mechanism for community 
engagement that established a new institutionalised relationship between Bristol City Council, the 
Police, various statutory agencies and Bristol’s diverse Muslim community. Building the Bridge was 
widely celebrated as a story of local success and a model of good practice, particularly in comparison 
with how Prevent had been implemented and received elsewhere. Our research examined in greater 
detail to what extent Building the Bridge facilitated a genuinely participatory engagement between 
public authorities and Bristol’s Muslim communities. In this report, we discuss our findings regarding 
the organisations’ dynamics of participation and representation, the kinds of activities initiated by 
Building the Bridge, and offer some reflections on a possible future for Building the Bridge, beyond 
Prevent. Although its activities were chiefly concerned with the overall aim of preventing violent 
extremism, Building the Bridge enabled interventions that addressed some key community 
grievances and facilitated the engagement of young people, women and mosque communities in the 
city. For a short period of time, Prevent funding enabled a regulated form of community engagement, 
some of which has continued even after the withdrawal of resources.  
Key findings 
 Although initiated by a nationally defined political agenda, individuals involved in Building the 
Bridge were keen to establish a joint understanding of locally specific problems and potential 
solutions. Participants in Building the Bridge felt that the forum enabled them to raise public 
authorities’ awareness of community concerns and discuss the implications of local politics 
and policing practices. 
 Bristol’s approach to implementing the previous Government’s Prevent Programme provided 
several institutional mechanisms for Muslim community involvement, including leadership 
capacity-building, agenda setting powers and representation of a variety of perspectives in an 
advisory body. 
 This ad-hoc organisational structure had a significant impact on the density of contacts and 
interactions between local authorities and the Muslim community, and thus addressed some 
of the previous deficits regarding Muslims’ political representation in the city. 
 The availability of funding enabled the provision of community activities, including workshops 
and skills development for young people and Muslim women in Bristol. Building the Bridge 




provides evidence that there is great need for such opportunities beyond the limited scope of 
a Prevent agenda.  
 While Building the Bridge sought to give voice to a diverse and multi-faceted constituency 
and made continuous efforts to expand its reach, a few Muslim groups preferred not to get 
involved with the forum. Some participants expressed concern that a number of Muslim 
organisations received more attention within Building the Bridge than others, and its remit 
could have been extended with regard to ethnic and class based diversity. 
 A currently ongoing discussion within the Muslim community concerns the role and the 
participation of Muslim women within Building the Bridge and mosque committees in Bristol 
more generally.  
 The continuation of Building the Bridge meetings and activities after the discontinuation of 
Prevent funding demonstrates that the organisation has potential to act as a post-Prevent 
democratic and consultative forum and could continue to enable community engagement 
with the local authority and statutory agencies in the future. 
Recommendations 
Bristol has developed a unique participatory approach to implementing the Prevent Programme, 
which facilitated a hitherto unprecedented level of civic engagement between local authorities and 
minority communities. The city should draw on this success and develop this model further: 
 The institutionalised relationship between public authorities and minority communities 
should be used to further improve the Local Authority’s and other statutory agencies’ ability 
to address minority groups’ concerns. A commitment to the institutionalised cooperation 
within Building the Bridge is required, which also implies financial support for the 
maintenance of the organisational structure. 
 The ad-hoc organisational structure of Building the Bridge should be further institutionalised 
through a regulatory framework which specifies a rotation principle and the electoral 
procedure for its leadership. This framework should determine the frequency of meetings 
and offer criteria for an improvement of the representativeness of Building the Bridge.  
 Developing this collaboration would require a new constituting moment for Building the 
Bridge, which includes a clarification of future aims and objectives. We suggest the future of 
Building the Bridge could be taken into three directions, each of which has implications for 
the organisations’ profile and composition. It is possible that elements of the three models 
could be combined with each other. 
o Model A: a countering extremism forum (a forum that draws on the Prevent legacy 
but is extended to challenge various forms of extremism) 
o Model B: a Black and Minority Ethnic communities forum (a consultative forum for 
Bristol’s established and newly settled Black and Minority Ethnic communities) 
o Model C: a Muslim forum (a post-Prevent Muslim forum that provides a democratic 
space for Muslim communities)  
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Building the Bridge is a Bristol-based forum that links Bristol’s Muslim communities and groups with 
the City Council, police and other statutory organisations in the city. It aims ‘to encourage and 
support the Muslim community to play an active part within the communities of Bristol’.1 
This report is the outcome of a seven-month research project studying Building the Bridge. The 
project is based on collaboration between the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the 
University of Bristol and Building the Bridge. It was carried out within, and funded by, the Productive 
Margins: Regulating for Engagement research programme. 2  The Productive Margins research 
programme seeks to connect academics and communities in Bristol and South Wales to co-produce 
research that explores mechanisms for more effective ‘bottom-up’ engagement of communities in 
decision-making across politics, policy and the arts. 
Based on interviews with individuals involved in 
Building the Bridge, documentary analysis and review 
of secondary literature, this report explores and 
evaluates the history and development of Building the 
Bridge as a mechanism for Muslim community 
participation in local governance in Bristol. It analyses 
Building the Bridge’s achievements, reflects on the 
challenges it faced, and frames some proposals for its 
future development. 
This report is the culmination of the first phase of the 
research project. The second phase of the research 
will comprise participatory research with Muslim 
groups in the city focused on the question: what are 
the effective mechanisms for Muslim women’s 
engagement in decision-making? The report also feeds 
into the wider work of the Productive Margins 
research programme, addressing the programme’s 
objective to deepen our understanding of how 
                                                          
1 http://www.allmosquestogether.org/building-the-bridge/ 
2 This research programme is funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s Connected Communities 
funding scheme. It involves research teams from the University of Bristol and Cardiff University and 
community organisations and social enterprises in Bristol and South Wales. See: 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/public-engagement/events/margins/ 




communities can generate bottom-up approaches to engagement, by sharing experiences and 
analysis across projects and initiatives within the programme.  
Background to Building the Bridge 
Building the Bridge emerged in 2008 as Bristol’s approach to implementing the Labour Government’s 
Prevent agenda. It was funded by Bristol City Council with Prevent funding, and became a key 
mechanism for the local delivery of Prevent in the city. This report explores the implications of 
Building the Bridge’s origins in the government’s counter-terrorism agenda, as well as the extent to 
which Building the Bridge assumed a role and purpose that went beyond the Prevent agenda (and the 
scope for this in the future). 
Prevent is one of four elements of the government’s CONTEST counter-terrorism strategy that was 
introduced in 2003. Sitting alongside Pursue (focused on detection and intelligence gathering); 
Prepare (emergency services and contingency planning) and Protect (infrastructural security), 
Prevent aimed to counter violent extremist ideologies and the values underpinning (support for) 
terrorism. Following the 2005 London attacks, Prevent was re-launched in 2007 to respond to the 
threat of ‘home-grown’ terrorism through greater emphasis on working with Muslim communities to 
prevent violent extremism.  
The strategy assumed that violent extremism is facilitated by a combination of interlocking factors, 
including (1) an ideology that justifies terrorism, (2) radicalisers and their networks, (3) individuals 
who are vulnerable to radical messages, (4) communities that are poorly equipped to resist and 
challenge extremism, and (5) grievances, ‘some genuine and some perceived, and some of course 
directed very specifically against government’. 3  Based on these assumptions, Prevent was 
reconceived as a ‘hearts and minds’4 community engagement approach to ‘challenging the violent 
extremist ideology and supporting mainstream voices’.5 The revised strategy released £140 million 
worth of funding for initiatives aimed at: capacity-building within Muslim communities to strengthen 
resilience to violent extremism; community engagement and outreach; developing theologically-
based counter-narratives to Al-Qaeda inspired ideology and promoting ‘moderate’ interpretations of 
Islam;6 and youth engagement and counter-radicalisation.7 Those local areas with significant numbers 
of Muslims were eligible to receive Prevent funding – including Bristol from 2007 to 2010. 
                                                          
3 HM Government (2008) The Prevent Strategy: A Guide for Local Partners in England. Stopping People 
Becoming or Supporting Terrorists or Violent Extremists (London: HM Government), page 5. 
4 DCLG (2007) Preventing Violent Extremism: Winning Hearts and Minds (London: DCLG). 
5 HM Government (2008), page 6. 
6 E.g. the Radical Middle Way project, which received £350,000 of Prevent funding. See Engage (2009) Figures 
for Government funding of Muslim organisations revealed, Friday 27th March 2009: 
http://www.iengage.org.uk/component/content/article/290-figures-for-government-funding-of-muslim-
organisations-revealed 




Prevent and Muslim community engagement 
In the years following its re-launch and implementation, Prevent came to be heavily criticised and, in 
the words of one commentator, widely regarded as ‘failed and friendless’.8 In particular, Prevent was 
often viewed with suspicion by those Muslim communities with whom government sought to 
engage, many of whom viewed Prevent as mechanism for the surveillance of Muslim populations,9 
or, as one contributor to a House of Commons committee put it, as ‘Pursue in sheep’s clothing’.10 
There was widespread criticism of the ways in which Prevent focused on Muslims and distributed 
funding for community projects through the prism of counter-terrorism.11 Additionally, many were 
critical of the ways in which the Prevent agenda merged with the government’s Community Cohesion 
agenda, arguing this dissipated the focus of Prevent, whilst securitising and undermining Community 
Cohesion.12 Many critics characterised Prevent as an instrument of discursive and institutional control 
that incentivised engagement with what government determined as acceptable versions of Islam, 
where the political focus was predominantly on ideology and individual cognitive dispositions 
towards radicalisation and less on the marked inequalities among Muslims that might feed into 
perceptions of injustice.13  
Nevertheless, analysing the local implementation of Prevent across three cities, O’Toole et al 
(2013a/b) have shown that there was significant variation in the ways in which Prevent played out at 
the local level.14 In Birmingham, for example, they found that, subsequent to the Pathfinder year of 
2007/8, Prevent came to be perceived as a highly securitised, police-led programme, and the capacity 
of Prevent initiatives to engage Muslim communities in the city was severely hampered by 
widespread suspicion towards Prevent, not least as a consequence of Project Champion.15 Project 
Champion was a local policing initiative that involved establishing 216 overt and covert CCTV and 
ANPR cameras in two areas of Muslim settlement in Birmingham, with little and flawed community 
                                                          
7 E.g. Quilliam, a ‘counter-extremism’ think-tank, which received £1.2 million worth of Prevent funding. See 
Engage (2009). 
8 Paul Thomas (2010) ‘Failed and Friendless: The UK’s “Preventing Violent Extremism” Programme’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations (12, 3: 442-458). 
9 Arun Kundnani (2009) Spooked! How to not Prevent Violent Extremism (London: Institute of Race Relations): 
http://www.irr.org.uk/pdf2/spooked.pdf  
10 House of Commons (2010) Preventing Violent Extremism: Sixth Report of Session 2009–10, Communities and 
Local Government Committee (London: House of Commons), page 8. 
11 Yahya Birt (2009) ‘Promoting Virulent Envy?’, The RUSI Journal (154, 4: 52-58). 
12 Paul Thomas (2010); Charles Husband and Yunis Alam (2011) Social Cohesion and Counter-Terrorism: A Policy 
Contradiction? (Bristol: Policy Press). 
13 Birt (2009); Kundnani (2009); Aleksandra Lewicki (2014) Social Justice through Citizenship? The Politics of 
Muslim Integration in Germany and Great Britain (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan). 
14 Therese O’Toole, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas, Tariq Modood, Nasar Meer and Stephen Jones (2013) Taking Part: 
Muslim Participation in Contemporary Governance (Bristol: University of Bristol): 
http://www.bristol.ac.uk/ethnicity/projects/muslimparticipation/documents/mpcgreport.pdf 
15 And see Arshad Isakjee and Chris Allen (2013) ‘‘A Catastrophic Lack of Inquisitiveness’: A Critical Study of the 
Impact and Narrative of the Project Champion Surveillance Project in Birmingham’, Ethnicities (13, 6: 729-
750). 




engagement.16 Elsewhere, Husband and Alam’s (2011) study of the local implementation of Prevent 
in five boroughs in West Yorkshire also found that fears of local communities towards Prevent-
funded initiatives meant that in practice often worthwhile initiatives struggled to gain community 
support due to their association with Prevent.17 By contrast, in Leicester, O’Toole et al found that 
whilst there was significant local opposition to the implementation of Prevent, it nonetheless 
developed in a collaborative manner, with Muslim representatives and interfaith bodies playing a 
significant role in (re)shaping Prevent to address local cohesion objectives. Prevent in Leicester was 
rebranded as ‘Mainstreaming Moderation’, in an effort to avoid what was locally perceived as the 
negative connotations of ‘Prevent’, and from the outset Prevent in Leicester was focussed on 
addressing all forms of violent extremism – long before this became central government policy. In the 
London borough of Tower Hamlets, local agencies and community organisations there exercised 
considerable autonomy in interpreting and implementing Prevent,18 drawing down funding to enable 
youth work, women’s projects and inclusion initiatives among Muslim communities in the borough. 
Thus prior to 2010, only four of the 28 Prevent projects funded in Tower Hamlets had any connection 
with ‘hard edge’ security concerns, with the rest largely focused on community cohesion and social 
inclusion objectives. 
Whilst the aims and rationale of Prevent have been widely criticised, and its implementation 
frequently hampered by negative and hostile perceptions, it is important to consider the local 
contexts in which Prevent has been implemented,19 and to consider how local actors have responded 
to and shaped forms of community engagement conducted under the rubric of Prevent.20 
Implementing Prevent in Bristol 
The approach to the implementation of Prevent in Bristol has been celebrated as a story of local 
success and ‘as a model of good practice’21 and Bristol has been described as a ‘market leader’ in 
                                                          
16 See Thames Valley Police (2010) Project Champion Review (London: Thames Valley Police), which found 
evidence of an explicit strategy of concealment of the counter-terrorism purposes of the cameras from the 
wider public. See also, Steve Jolly (2010) ‘Birmingham’s spy-cam scheme has had its cover blown’, The 
Guardian, 23rdJune 2010: 
http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/libertycentral/2010/jun/23/birmingham-spy-cam-scheme  
17 Husband and Alam (2011); and see Yunus Samad (2013) ‘Community Cohesion without Parallel Lives in 
Bradford’, Patterns of Prejudice (47, 3: 269-287). 
18 Giorgia Iacopini, Laura Stock and Kerstin Junge (2011) Evaluation of Tower Hamlets Prevent Projects (London: 
The Tavistock Institute). 
19 And see Vivien Lowndes and Leila Thorp (2010) Preventing Violent Extremism: Why Local Context Matters’, 
The New Extremism in the 21st Century, R Eatwell and MJ Goodwin (eds.) (Oxford: Routledge). 
20 And see Therese O’Toole, Stephen H. Jones, Daniel Nilsson DeHanas and Tariq Modood (2013) ‘Prevent after 
TERFOR: Why Local Context Still Matters’, Public Spirit, 16th December 2013: 
http://www.publicspirit.org.uk/the-importance-of-local-context-for-preventing-extremism/ 
21 Jay Edwards and Benoît Gomis (2011) Islamic Terrorism in the UK since 9/11: Reassessing the ‘Soft’ Response, 
Chatham House International Security Programme Paper - ISP PP 2011/03 (London: Chatham House). 




Prevent work. 22  Commentators have argued that the city of Bristol managed to turn the 
implementation of Prevent into a genuine collaboration between public authorities and Bristol’s 
Muslim communities, which manifested itself in the re-branding of Prevent as ‘Building the Bridge’. A 
significant part in the mobilising and credentialising of a collaborative approach to implementing 
Prevent was the arrest of Isa Ibrahim in April 2008: a Bristol based convert who had been 
experimenting with explosives and planned to target the Broadmead shopping centre.23 At the time, 
Avon and Somerset Police employed several community engagement officers who had established 
relationships with various mosques and Muslim organisations on the ground. Before Ibrahim could 
put his plan into practice, one of those community engagement officers received a call from a 
member of the mosque that Ibrahim attended. It was the first time a counter-terrorism intervention 
in the UK had been instigated by the Muslim community, and the emergence of Building the Bridge 
was seen as augmenting the constructive relationships that had been developing between Muslims 
and the police. 24  Building the Bridge has been credited with further facilitating bottom-up 
engagement between Muslims and the City Council, local agencies and the police, and with creating a 
space for dialogue and interaction between Muslim communities of different ethnic backgrounds in 
the city that had not hitherto existed. Compared to many other localities, the Bristol experience 
appears to exemplify a more participatory approach to the implementation of Prevent.  
In 2010, the newly formed Coalition Government announced a review of Prevent and suspended 
Prevent funding. When its revised Prevent strategy was announced in June 2011, it made a series of 
changes to the aims and practices of Prevent, and identified 25 priority areas which would be eligible 
for Prevent funding, based on intelligence assessments, rather than ‘simple demographics’.25 Bristol 
was not included within these 25 priority areas under the new strategy, and thus no longer receives 
Prevent funding from the Home Office. Bristol City Council has continued to support Building the 
Bridge, and this report aims to feed into the wider processes of reflection on Building the Bridge’s 
future.  
                                                          
22 Safer Bristol (2011) Minutes of Safer Bristol Partnership Executive Board Meeting, 19/05/2011, (Bristol: SBP): 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/community_and_safety/safer_bristol/Minutes%20S
afer%20Bristol%20Executive%20Board%2019%20May%202011.pdf; Liban Obsiye (2010) Prevention Strategy: 
Local Success but a National Disaster (Bristol Somali Media Group: Bristol): 
http://smgbristol.com/2010/06/09/prevention-strategy-local-success-but-a-national-disaster/ 
23 Steven Morris (2009) ‘Turned in by his Community, the Extremist Who Wanted to Belong’, The Guardian, 17th 
July: http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2009/jul/17/isa-ibrahim-profile-muslim-community; And see BBC News 
(2008) ‘Teenager facing terrorism charges’: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/7373929.stm 
24 Morris (2009), Edwards and Gomis (2011). 
25 Home Office (2011) Prevent Strategy (London: HM Govt): 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/97976/prevent-strategy-
review.pdf, pages 97-8. 




Building the Bridge as a mechanism for community engagement 
Given the emphasis on collaboration and participation that has characterised Building the Bridge, the 
project examines the Bristol experience of Building the Bridge as a ‘regulated form of engagement’.26 
We explore the strengths and limitations of Building the Bridge as a mechanism for bottom-up 
engagement and evaluate the participatory practices it brought about. In particular, we examine how 
participation was facilitated within the institutional architecture of Building the Bridge and 
investigate how dynamics of regulation, collaboration and claims-making unfolded in its activities. 
The study assesses Building the Bridge as a mechanism for the representation of Bristol’s Muslim 
communities, and explores the participatory nature of its activities. Our analysis concludes with 
reflections on the possible future of Building the Bridge.  
Defining a participatory approach 
A key concern of our research is that terms such as 
‘collaboration’ and ‘engagement’ can be invoked within 
participatory initiatives without necessarily entailing equality 
between participants or substantive participation. Political 
consultations, for example, can co-opt community 
representatives and merely serve to legitimise an otherwise 
top-down approach to policy development and 
implementation. It is thus necessary to present criteria for 
evaluating whether Building the Bridge facilitated or inhibited a 
genuinely participatory engagement between public 
authorities and Bristol’s Muslim communities. Without 
claiming that the following list is complete, we suggest that a 
participatory approach requires that: a variety of perspectives 
is included in discussions and negotiations; definitions of 
problems, political objectives or the agenda are defined 
collaboratively; negotiations allow for shifts in opinion among 
participants; interactions generate trust and a sense that 
everybody’s contribution is respected; pre-existing power 
imbalances are challenged and reduced rather than 
maintained; and the outcomes of the endeavour reflect a 
variety of interests.27  
                                                          
26 University of Bristol & Cardiff University (2012) Productive Margins: Regulating for Engagement. Case for 
Support, http://www.bristol.ac.uk/public-engagement/pdfs/productive-margins-case.pdf 
27 See Andrea Cornwall and Vera Schattan P. Coelho (eds.) (2007) Spaces for Change? The Politics of 
Participation in New Democratic Arenas (London: Zed) and Tehseen Noorani, Claire Blencowe and Julian 




 A variety of perspectives is 
included, and these are 
also reflected in the 
outcomes  
 Problems, policy objectives 
and the political agenda 
are defined collaboratively 
 There is scope for shifts in 
opinion and awareness of 
the interests of others  
 There is trust among 
participants and a sense 
that their contributions are 
respected 
 Pre-existing power 
imbalances are challenged 
or reduced 




This project focuses on the extent to which Building the Bridge operated as a regulatory mechanism 
that created a space for and enabled substantive engagement of Muslim communities in local 
governance in Bristol.  
Research design 
We translated these criteria into a qualitative interview framework, which included questions such as 
‘would you describe Bristol City Council as an agenda setter or facilitator of Building the Bridge 
meetings and activities?’ or ‘did you have a sense that particular groups were empowered within 
Building the Bridge?’ The research involved a desktop review of minutes of meetings and documents 
published by the Council, consultation meetings with Bristol City Council, the chairs of Building the 
Bridge and various Building the Bridge participants, as well as 22 qualitative research interviews with 
individuals involved in Building the Bridge. Research participants were identified through a variety of 
channels, including through published documents, snowballing and reaching out to Muslim 
organisations in Bristol.  
 
  
                                                          




 In what ways did Building the Bridge re-fashion spaces for engagement for Muslims in the city?  
 Who participated in Building the Bridge and why?  
 What were the mechanisms that facilitated inclusion and participation?  
 Were there any obstacles to inclusion and participation?  
 What was the impact of Building the Bridge on engagement between the City Council and 
Muslim communities in the city? 
 How might Building the Bridge develop in the future? 




Overview of the report 
This report concludes the first phase of our research into the history and emergence of Building the 
Bridge. We begin by offering information on the demographics of Bristol’s Muslim population, their 
patterns of settlement and revisit key findings of previous studies on Black and minority ethnic 
communities’ participation in Bristol’s public life. The main section of the report describes the 
development of the institutional architecture of Building the Bridge and provides an account of its 
participatory dynamics. We then discuss the representativeness of Building the Bridge, and elaborate 
on the kinds of activities that were pursued through Building the Bridge. Finally, the report offers 
reflections on the possible future for Building the Bridge.  
  




2. Muslims in Bristol 
Demographic profile 
According to the 2011 Census, Bristol has a population of 428,000 residents and 22,000 of these self-
ascribe as Muslim. The figure has risen considerably in the last ten years: in the 2001 Census, only 
7,600 individuals in Bristol self-ascribed as Muslim (2% of the overall population). Comprising 5.1% of 
the total Bristol population, the local Muslim constituency is now slightly larger than the national 
average, which is 4.8%. The growth of the Muslim population in Bristol, similar to the national 
increase from 2.7% in 2001 to 4.8% in 2011, can be explained by a variety of factors. There is on-
going marriage migration to the UK from the Indian sub-continent,28 and higher than average birth 
rates among South Asian Muslims.29 The number of White Britons who are reverting or converting to 
Islam is also on the rise, as is the salience of (at times perhaps even nominal) Muslim self-
identification among young British-born descendants of migrants. Most importantly, Britain has 
received refugees and asylum seekers from African countries such as Somalia, the majority of whom 
are Muslim. Bristol City Council noted that between 2002 and 2010, the city issued the second 
highest number of National Insurance numbers to Somalis (after Birmingham, which had the highest 
number of new registrations in the UK).30 The 2011 Census indicated that about 8,100 Somalis 
currently reside in Bristol;31 the Council suggests this number might be an under-estimate as the 
Census did not necessarily register men living in informal accommodation.32 The actual figure then 
                                                          
28 See Katharine Charsley, Brooke Storer-Church, Michaela Benson and Nicholas Van Hear (2012) ‘Marriage 
Related Migration to the UK’, International Migration Review (46, 4: 861-890). 
29 See Bristol City Council (2010), Building Bristol Together. A City-Wide Community Cohesion Strategy 2010 – 
2013 (Bristol: Bristol City Council), 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/community_and_safety/community_development/
Community%20Cohesion%20Strategy.pdf for evidence of high birth rates among Pakistani, Indian and Somali 
mothers in Bristol, page 6. 
30 Bristol City Council (2012) Community Profile: Somali Community in Bristol, (Bristol: Bristol City Council): 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/council_and_democracy/statistics_and_census_info
rmation/2011%20Somali%20Community%20Profile_270212.pdf, page 6. 
31 Bristol City Council (2013a) Census 2011 Topic Report. Community Cohesion Statistics, July 2013 (Bristol: 
Bristol City Council) 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/council_and_democracy/statistics_and_census_info
rmation/Community%20Cohesion%20Statistics_July%202013_0.pdf: Somalis were not classified as a separate 
ethnic group on the 2011 Census form, but were included in the ‘Black African’ and ‘Black Other’ groups. 
Bristol City Council estimated the number of Somalis living in Bristol by taking the number of ‘Black Africans’ 
and ‘Black Others’ who self-ascribed as Muslim and subtracting those Muslims born in parts of Africa outside 
Eastern Africa (page 7). Nearly 5,000 Census respondents reported that they were born in Somalia (page 14), a 
figure which of course does not include children born to Somali parents in the UK. 
32 Census 2011 Topic Report, Bristol City Council (2013a) page 7. This observation can be further supported by 
findings from a survey conducted by Ethnic Focus, which indicated that significant numbers of Somali 
respondents had not filled in the 2001 Census due to language barriers or because they found the form too 
(footnote continued) 




might be between 8,100 and 10,000 (compared to 6,863 Pakistanis and 2,104 Bangladeshis), which 
could potentially increase the overall number of Muslims in Bristol.  
The ethnic composition of the Muslim population is diverse, with the largest three groups being 
Somali, Pakistani and Bangladeshi (and smaller Arab, Turkish or Iranian and Kurdish populations). 
Settlement is spread across the city, with 
significant numbers of Muslims residing in each 
ward; although Muslims are particularly 
numerously represented in Ashley, Lockleaze, 
Cabot, Hillfields, Easton, Eastville and Lawrence 
Hill.33 More recent arrivals have settled mostly 
in Lawrence Hill, Ashley, Easton and Eastville.34 
The largest growth of ethnic minority groups in 
Bristol has been within the Polish and Somali 
populations.35 The 2011 Census showed that 
English is the main language spoken in Bristol, 
followed by Polish and Somali.36 Urdu, Panjabi, 
Arabic and Bengali were among the top 10 
languages spoken by local residents.  
Drawing on 12 in-depth interviews and a survey of 1,000 Muslims in Bristol, a 2008 study by Ethnic 
Focus found that the Muslim community in Bristol has a young age profile, with around 54% of the 
respondents being younger than 34 years.37 It also showed that the main reason for interviewees 
settling in Bristol was to be close to family and members of the same ethnic group; and most 
respondents had immediate and extended family living in Bristol.38  
Due to recent immigration, according to the Council, schools in Bristol are diversifying much faster 
than the population of Bristol.39 The 2010 Schools Census showed that 42.7% of children in Local 
Authority maintained nursery schools are from non-White British backgrounds.40 Somali children are 
the largest non-White group with 2,237 pupils or 4.5% of the total population (white Eastern 
European children numbered 825 or 1.7%). The Council’s Community Cohesion Strategy notes, 
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page 39. 
33 Census 2011 Topic Report, Bristol City Council (2013a), page 33. 
34 Census 2011 Topic Report, Bristol City Council (2013a), page 3. 
35 The proportion of people who self-classified as not ‘white British’ has increased from 12% to 22% of the 
Bristol population (Census 2011 Topic Report, Bristol City Council (2013a), page 2. 
36 Census 2011 Topic Report, Bristol City Council (2013a), page 18. 
37 Ethnic Focus (2008), page 17. 
38 Ethnic Focus (2008), pages 19 and 27. 
39 Building Bristol Together, Bristol City Council (2010), page 5. 
40 Building Bristol Together, Bristol City Council (2010), page 5. 




however, that only 4.4% of teachers were from BME backgrounds, and 1.79% of teachers were Black 
or Black British with just one Somali teacher.41  
Quality of life 
In its Cohesion Strategy 2010, the Local Authority 
signalled that the increasing diversity within Bristol’s 
schools has also been accompanied by problems of 
inequalities and conflict, acknowledging there were 
‘tensions within some Bristol’s schools around the 
intolerance of diverse family life, perceived unfairness 
of housing allocation, inter-racial tension, a rise in gang 
activity, ‘Islamophobia’ and anti-Somali feelings, and an 
increase in homophobic and disablist hate crime’.42  The 
Ethnic Focus survey report found that Somalis had the 
lowest levels of participation in paid work compared to 
other ethnic groups, and unemployment was also high 
among Kurdish, Iraqi and African groups.43  
Notwithstanding these tensions and inequalities, 
findings from Bristol City Council’s most recent Quality 
of Life in Bristol (2013) annual survey highlighted some 
mixed trends among the ethnic minority and Muslim populations in Bristol.44 Overall, 83% of 
respondents reported that they were satisfied with their neighbourhood, although satisfaction was 
significantly lower in deprived areas of the city, and among Black and minority ethnic and Muslim 
                                                          
41 Building Bristol Together, Bristol City Council (2010), page 5. 
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(2011) United Kingdom: Challenging Diversity in Education and School Life, Accept Pluralism, National Case 
Studies, Final Country Reports,www.accept-pluralism.eu, (Florence: Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced 
Studies). 
43 Ethnic Focus (2008) pages 10 and 26. Labour Force Survey based research commissioned by the Equality and 
Human Rights Commission showed however that during the financial crisis, the unemployment rate of 
workers from India, Pakistan and Bangladesh had risen to 12%, while White British unemployment was at 
7.8% and for new arrivals from Eastern and Central Europe unemployment hovered at 5%. Established 
minorities’ employment patterns were thus most severely affected by the economic recession, Madeleine 
Sumption and Will Somerville (2010) The UK’s New Europeans. Progress and Challenges Five Years after 
Accession, Equalities and Human Rights Commission Policy Report (London: Equalities and Human Rights 
Commission and Migration Policy Research Institute). 
44 Bristol City Council (2013b) Quality of Life in Bristol: Quality of life in your neighbourhood survey results 2012, 
May 2013 (Bristol: Bristol City Council): 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/council_and_democracy/consultations/qol2013-
report_0_0.pdf 




residents. 45  Nevertheless, Black and minority ethnic and Muslim respondents, despite their 
concentration in less wealthy areas, were more likely to say that they ‘feel they belong to their 
neighbourhood’ and were more likely to find that ‘people in their neighbourhoods got on well 
together’ than the population overall.46 A significant proportion of Muslim respondents (75%) were 
likely to agree that local people are treated with respect, compared to 67% of the overall sample, 
whilst 31% of Muslim respondents reported they felt able to influence decision making in their local 
area, compared to 24% of the overall sample.47 A majority (60%) of the Muslim respondents in the 
Ethnic Focus study, however, reported limited interest in getting actively involved in local decision-
making, and this was especially evident among the Somali community.48  
According to the Ethnic Focus study, most 
interviewed Muslims stressed that they would 
like to stay in Bristol and reported a strong 
sense of belonging to and satisfaction with 
their local area as a place to live.49  Their 
report highlighted the importance of ‘psycho-
social benefits arising from having access to 
appropriate cultural and religious facilities 
within local areas’.50 Nevertheless, the study 
also found that there was a lack of facilities 
for young people, especially young Muslim 
women, as well as crowded prayer facilities 
on Fridays, with a shortage of worship space 
for women in particular.51  
Political representation  
There have been some changes in the political representation of minorities in local structures of 
decision-making in Bristol over the last decade. A study that was conducted in 2001 by Bousetta of 
political representation and participation of BME communities suggested that ethnic minorities were 
effectively politically disenfranchised in Bristol. 52  Bousetta’s research showed that despite a 
significant concentration of Black and minority ethnic communities in a small number of wards, their 
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48 Ethnic Focus (2008), page 38. 
49 Ethnic Focus (2008), pages 29, 33 and 37. 
50 Ethnic Focus (2008), page 11. 
51 Ethnic Focus (2008), pages 12 and 31. 
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Minority People in Public Life (Bristol: Centre for the Study of Citizenship and Ethnicity, University of Bristol). 




votes did not seem to have any distinctive influence on electoral outcomes in these areas. The study 
found that poor electoral registration rates, negative perceptions of local authorities, under-
representation within the Council and statutory agencies, lack of consultation, leadership problems, 
racism and the absence of a politicisation of race53 were the main reasons for these participatory 
deficits. Bousetta argued that the Local Authority did not sufficiently take into consideration that 
ethnic minorities have distinct strategies for participating in politics (for instance via involvement in 
community organisations), which are related to their marginalised status in British society.54  
In the run-up to the 2012 mayoral election, a report for Bristol Fawcett argued that women and 
ethnic minorities continue to be chronically politically under-represented in the City Council and 
other key structures of power in the city.55 In that context, the Bristol Labour Party nominated Marvin 
Rees, who was raised by his British mother and Jamaican father in Easton, as its candidate for mayor. 
While Rees lost the vote to the independent entrepreneur George Ferguson, the fact that he ran for 
mayor was celebrated by many as a symbolic success for the political representation of Bristol’s BME 
communities. Indeed, although the election was not an explicit topic in research interviews, several 
respondents in our study mentioned Rees as a role model for young people in Bristol. During the 
mayoral election, Building the Bridge was instrumental in organising hustings specifically focused on 
Muslim community issues with all candidates who ran for Mayor and Police and Crime Commissioner. 
The 2013 elections increased the number of Councillors with an ethnic minority background from 
three to five.56 Four of these representatives consider themselves to be Muslim. One of the new 
elects, Hibaq Jama (Lawrence Hill) is Bristol’s first (female) Councillor with a Somali background. In 
2013, Faruk Choudhury, who is Councillor for Easton, became the first Asian, first Muslim and 
youngest ever Lord Mayor of Bristol at the age of 38.57 Recently, Shaheen Chaudhry was appointed 
High Sheriff of Bristol, which makes her the first Muslim female in this office. Such developments 
indicate some progress since Bousetta conducted his research in 2001, and the establishment of 
Building the Bridge as an institutionalised link between public authorities, statutory agencies and 
community organisations has also had an impact on the representation of a particular group within 
Bristol’s ethnic minority population in local structures of decision-making.  
                                                          
53 Bousetta found that the words race, ethnicity and multiculturalism were absent from digital and 
documentary self-representations of the Local Authority. 
54 Bousetta (2001), page 9. 
55 Natasha Carver (2012) “The Right Man for Bristol?” Gender Representation and the Mayor for Bristol (Bristol: 
Bristol Fawcett): 
http://www.bristolfawcett.org.uk/Documents/CountingWomenIn/TheRightManForBristol.pdf 
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2013; Jay Jethwa (Conservative) for Stockwood since 2007; Mahmadur Khan (Labour) for Eastville since 2011; 
and Afzal Shah (Labour) for Easton since 2013. 
57 Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management (2013a) Up Our Street, Newsletter of Easton and 
Laurence Hill, (Bristol: Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood Management). 





The Muslim population in Bristol is expanding and diversifying: in addition to Bristol’s long-
established Muslim communities with roots in South Asia, the settlement of Somali Muslims in the 
city has been a notable recent development, and Somalis now comprise the largest ethnic group of 
Muslims in the city. Questions concerning the political representation and political inclusion of ethnic 
minority and Muslim groups need to attend to this diversity. Our brief overview here also signals 
concerns about the inclusion of Muslim women and younger people in community and political 
spaces in the city. Nevertheless, such questions cannot turn on numbers alone – whilst presence 
undoubtedly matters, voice and impact are also key to our analysis of whether Building the Bridge 
has facilitated the substantive participation of Muslims in local decision-making. In the following 
section, we consider how Building the Bridge emerged as a mechanism for Muslim community 
engagement, before analysing who came to be involved, and how, and the kinds of issues and claims 
that were addressed by Building the Bridge.   




3. Development of Building the Bridge  
Prevent in Bristol 
In 2007, Bristol City Council secured a grant through the ‘Preventing Violent Extremism’ (PVE) 
Pathfinder Programme. This funded two academic studies of the Muslim community in Bristol, and 
then rose substantially in subsequent years, enabling a wider array of activities, with Bristol City 
Council receiving £125,000 in 2008/9, £150,000 in 2009/10 and £165,000 in 2010/11.58 Initially, the 
Council commissioned the Centre for the Study of Ethnicity and Citizenship at the University of Bristol 
to generate a myth-busting booklet on Muslims in Bristol and Britain, which gave an overview of 
Muslim organisations in Bristol, discussed popular misconceptions about Islam and rebutted them 
with research-based evidence.59 In 2007, the Council also commissioned the London-based Ethnic 
Focus to provide a representative study of the Muslim population in Bristol,60 to help the Council to 
develop ‘a better understanding of the numbers and the diversity of Bristol’s Muslim population’ and 
provide ‘responsible services’.61  
This research based phase of Bristol City Council’s approach to implementing Prevent was followed 
by a planning phase during which Bristol City Council set out to connect various statutory agencies 
and community organisations who had a role in the delivery of Prevent. The initiation phase was 
guided by the rationale that Bristol City Council, local Police, the Crime and Drugs Partnership ‘Safer 
Bristol’, the Youth Offending Team, the Criminal Justice Board, the National Health Service, and other 
statutory agencies including youth services or educational authorities were seeking to engage with 
the Muslim community, and these efforts could be coordinated with each other, rather than 
advanced separately. The Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) was put in charge of the delivery of 
Prevent and acted as Executive Board in the allocation of Prevent funding.62  
The creation of Building the Bridge  
The following sections present findings from our research into the institutional genesis of Building the 
Bridge, and give voice to individuals involved in its creation.  
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The Prevent Programme Board commissioned Latif Ismail, the Director of the Chippenham based 
consultancy Transparency Solutions, who has a Somali background and lives in Bristol, to offer advice 
on how cooperation between various corporate actors and the Muslim community could be further 
institutionalised. Ismail told us that it was crucial that the individuals who initiated the cooperation, 
including Community Cohesion Manager Ian Quaife, at Bristol City Council, or Chief Superintendent 
Julian Moss at Avon and Somerset Police, supported the idea of an equal partnership with Bristol’s 
Muslim community and the principle of collective ownership of Prevent. The fact that successful 
arrests of terrorist suspects had just taken place, and that Isa Ibrahim’s arrest in particular had been 
enabled by a mosque initiative, contributed to a perception that a genuine collaboration with 
Bristol’s Muslim communities was possible and in the interest of all parties. Public authorities had a 
sense that this very recent experience was also key to making the case to the Muslim community in 
Bristol for further preventative work.  
Early meetings: problematising Prevent and community representation 
To discuss the scope for such collaboration, Bristol City Council and the Police drew on pre-existing 
networks and invited Muslim community representatives to attend a series of meetings. Chief 
Superintendent Julian Moss told us how, at these first meetings in the City Hall, public authorities 
were faced with serious concerns on the part of the Muslim community about the Prevent agenda. As 
in other areas of the country, there was a sense that the name ‘Prevent’ itself and its city-wide 
implementation implied a suspicion of the whole of the Muslim community as prone to terrorism.63 
Moss described his impressions at the time:  
A confident community, which is great, and lots of energy and people turning up which was, 
for a community meeting, very, very unusual […] and there was a huge amount of sensitivity; I 
was really surprised about the sensitivity there was. […] I was really quite taken back at that 
meeting; I suppose there were a ball park figure of 50 people in the audience mostly from 
Muslim communities, and they gave us a really hard time. 
During these meetings, Muslim community representatives problematised the name ‘Prevent’, 
arguing that it implied suspicion. They also criticised the authorities for inviting too few Muslim 
community members to the scoping meetings and expressed dissatisfaction that the meetings were 
chaired by a Councillor rather than a community representative. Chief Superintendent Moss 
observed that ‘there was a huge drive from Muslim communities to be involved’ and in a greater 
capacity; in his view, the most important thing at this stage was that local authorities, including the 
Police, ‘did listen to what was being said’. Given the negative feedback their presentation had 
received, he realised that public authorities needed to take further steps to build a relationship with 
Muslim communities.  
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From Prevent to ‘Building the Bridge’ 
One of the first initiatives that was realised during this planning phase was a community conference 
that was called ‘Building the Bridge’, to which a wider audience of about 150 Muslims from a variety 
of backgrounds was invited. The conference was held on 15th March 2008 at the Council House in 
Bristol.64 It is against the background of these initial meetings that the name was changed from 
‘Prevent Programme Board’ to the title of this conference, ‘Building the Bridge’, which was seen as a 
title that reflected a more community oriented approach.  
The term ‘Prevent’ was met with hostility elsewhere, and in Leicester too, the term was jettisoned 
and the Prevent programme reformed and re-branded as ‘Mainstreaming Moderation’.  O’Toole et 
al’s (2013a) research shows, under New Labour, and especially during the Pathfinder year of 2007-8, 
many Local Authorities reinterpreted or modified Prevent, using the funding that it released to 
pursue community engagement or cohesion objectives. In part, this was due to the vagueness of the 
policy guidance from central government,65 but it was also a result of local actors seeking either to 
mitigate the negative aspects of Prevent or pursue more autonomous objectives or develop models 
that were more appropriate to local contexts. 
The institutional structure of Building the Bridge  
In response to Muslim participants’ request that the Executive Board should be chaired by a 
community representative, Latif Ismail was appointed as initial Chair. He explained the rationale for 
his appointment as a Chair of Building the Bridge: 
I was an independent Chair, but I was an independent Chair from the Muslim community. The 
individuals involved were very clear that this project was about working with the Muslim 
community, which is why we needed to have someone from that community – and that was 
very different from how Prevent bodies were designed elsewhere. 
The decision to appoint a Muslim representative to chair Building the Bridge can be seen as a 
distinctive feature of Bristol’s implementation of Prevent. Participants in these inaugural meetings of 
Building the Bridge expressed concern, however, that appointing a Muslim to the chairmanship of the 
Executive Board limited Muslim participation to one person and hence did not allow for the 
involvement of the wider Muslim community in Bristol. In response to this, a permanent Partnership 
Advisory Group (PAG) was set up, which consisted of a range of organised and non-affiliated Muslim 
community representatives who were to advise the Local Strategic Partnership. Bristol City Council 
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themselves’ [emphasis added]. John Denham (2013) ‘After Woolwich, we should not ‘Prevent’ certain views, 
but engage with them’, The Guardian, 29th Mary 2013: 
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and the Police furthermore appointed full-time staff, in several cases themselves with a Muslim 
ethno-religious background, to administer Building the Bridge meetings and activities. Table 1 
illustrates how multiple mechanisms of community involvement applied that allowed for power 
‘checks and balances’ on the part of Muslim community members.  





Firstly, the Executive Board, which had decision-making capacity in the delivery of Prevent and was 
responsible for the distribution of funding, was chaired by two community representatives. Three 
additional community group observers attended board meetings. Funding was allocated via a 
Commissioning Group that consisted of Vice Chair of Building the Bridge, Mohammed Elsharif and 
representatives of various statutory agencies, and was chaired by Bristol City Council. A Vulnerable 
Individuals Steering Group (VISG) was furthermore installed, which was chaired by Zaheer Shabir. A 
second larger body was the Partnership Advisory Group (PAG), which was empowered to influence 
the agenda of the Building the Bridge Board (BTB Board). The PAG consisted of a wider number of 
Muslim community organisations and non-affiliated Muslims and was chaired by the respective 
Councillors responsible for Community and Neighbourhoods in the Cabinet.66 Thirdly, Building the 
Bridge and its activities were administered by full-time staff, several of whom, such as Kalsoom Bashir 
and Shabana Kausar, had a Muslim background and drew on their own extensive community 
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networks (see Table 1). These two were particularly engaged in consulting various Muslim groups 
across Bristol and delivering some of the activities funded through Prevent.  
Husband and Alam’s (2011) study found that the involvement of Muslim officials in Prevent activities 
often served a useful legitimating role for Local Authorities, and lent authorities a reach into 
communities they otherwise found difficulty accessing. They also found, however, that the 
performance of such roles was often difficult for the Muslim officials involved and for their 
relationships with their communities – particularly where opposition to Prevent was high, and 
engagement with public authorities was low. This suggests that the efficacy of engaging Muslim staff 
within Prevent delivery can be fraught if mechanisms of Muslim community engagement within local 
governance more generally are sparse. 
Once the scoping phase was completed and the partnership institutionalised, Building the Bridge 
participants agreed that the Chair and Vice-Chair should be determined by an election process and a 
more formalised selection process, rather than via direct appointment by Bristol City Council. A call 
for nominations went out, and the shortlist was determined by a public vote among community 
representatives. Shortlisted candidates campaigned in their constituencies, and Bristol City Council 
sent out ballot papers to as many of their community and mosque contacts as possible. The election 
was followed by an interview process of the candidates with the highest number of votes. 
Zaheer Shabir of Bristol Jamia Mosque in Totterdown, 
an immigration lawyer who had been nominated by 
the Council of Bristol Mosques, received the highest 
vote, followed by Mohammed Elsharif, who works for 
the National Health Service and was very active in the 
local community in Easton. Zaheer Shabir was 
appointed to act as Chair of Building the Bridge, and 
Mohammed Elsharif became Vice-Chair. Shabir, once 
appointed, was told this was going to be the ‘the most 
powerful position for a Muslim in the city’; while he 
himself did not realise this at the time, he reflected 
that he had found this to be true during his time in 
office. He told us that the post not only endowed him 
with an influential voice within Building the Bridge, but 
it also facilitated access to local and national 
authorities, which included involvement in a variety of 
consultations and invitations by the British Prime 
Minister and the Queen.  
Community ownership of Building the Bridge 
The emergent institutional setup of Building the Bridge, however, was not universally appreciated. 
Chief Superintendent Julian Moss told us that there were critical voices within the Police and Bristol 




City Council, who were concerned that the redistribution of power went too far, or who worried that 
extremists might slip into the group of representatives empowered within Building the Bridge:  
There was real nervousness from my own Special Branch who were saying, ‘Hang on a sec; we 
can’t be doing this. We can’t let communities lead this work’ […] And you had nervousness 
from some of the leaders in the Local Authority who were saying, lots of them giving lots of 
support, but saying, ‘Well, no, you can’t have groups like this being led by members of the 
community. What happens if it’s the wrong member of the community who gets to lead it?’  
However, the architects of Building the Bridge had a strong sense that they needed to find the right 
balance between implementing central government objectives and achieving community ownership. 
Julian Moss argued that if they wanted ‘this to be successful, then it’s got to come from within the 
community’, and added that cooperation ‘can’t be centrally government driven if communities don’t 
feel like they’ve had a say in it’. The intention was to create ‘a partnership right from the beginning, 
as opposed to something that was being Police led’, as the latter approach had caused problems in 
other local contexts.67  
Agenda-setting 
Julian Moss’ account illustrates how Bristol City Council and Police were aware of and self-critical 
about their relative institutional power, and were prepared to diminish power asymmetries. Moss 
reflected on public authorities’ shifting role in the process, and the implications for the distribution of 
power within Building the Bridge:  
I think in terms of being agenda setters we had to help the ball start rolling by taking those 
positive steps; sort of bringing people together and listening to them because it was us that 
had the power and I think that was agenda setting in itself. Once momentum had been 
achieved I think we were able to play a much more facilitative role and once trust had become 
established you then were able to pass over that power and become increasingly comfortable 
with doing so and then you can become both facilitator and a participant in, ‘Well, this is your 
Building the Bridge; not ours’.  
Latif Ismail, the interim Chair, concurred that Building the Bridge was ‘very much a partnership that 
was led by the community, and it was probably the first time that the community and the local 
strategic partnership sat on a table as equal partners’. Beyond the initiators’ own views, a majority of 
participants in Building the Bridge felt that Bristol City Council and the Police initially acted as agenda 
setters in as much as they initiated the cooperation, but that they then took a step back and assumed 
a facilitator’s role in Building the Bridge meetings and activities. However, this view was less shared 
by representatives of the Council of Bristol Mosques, who perceived Building the Bridge as police led, 
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including in terms of its securitised focus as well as 
regarding the purpose of meetings and interactions. 
Tahir Mahmood of Bristol Islami Darasgah in 
Montpelier, the oldest mosque in Bristol, argued: 
Dealing with extremism, whether it was to go 
undercover to find or expose people who were 
maybe going off the lines was a police operation 
anyway and it was manifesting itself with high 
ranking officers meeting with the community.  So 
I think we always knew that they would be 
setting the agenda. 
In the perception of individuals who held office and leadership positions within Building the Bridge, 
however, Building the Bridge was community led. Applications for direct funding through Prevent, for 
instance, were considered by a Commissioning Group that consisted of representatives of a range of 
key stakeholders involved, including Vice-Chair Mohammed Elsharif. He explained how the chairs’ 
positions implied executive powers:  
The time we started leading it, I think the Council was just providing support and advice really – 
not making decisions about anything in the Board. We set the agenda, we set the priorities, we 
set the activities, we worked with community organisations to develop their own projects, so I 
think we were in charge in that period. […] Since we started chairing it we were really 
scrutinising all funding and making sure the finance goes to the right organisations, going to 
the right projects as well, so we have had that, you know, power to do that.   
Zaheer Shabir offered an account of how agenda items, whether they had been introduced by the 
Police, by the Council, or community representatives, were run by the Secretariat, the administrative 
arm of the board, and discussed in detail at BTB Board meetings:  
The Board would set the agenda, I would have a voice for the community as well and there 
were observers who also had a contribution to make – these were three organisations from 
the community. So it wasn’t that City Council or Police said ‘X should be done and it’s going to 
be done’, it was never that, everything was discussed, the positives and negatives, whatever 
issue came up […]. So I would be sitting with my Secretariat and we would go through the 
issues of the day or catch up with actions from last meeting and decide what we could have as 
part of the agenda. […] We had a fantastic structure that way and it was respected. 
Ian Quaife, at the time Community Cohesion Manager at Bristol City Council and one of the architects 
of Building the Bridge, highlighted that key decisions were always outcomes of negotiations:  
Yes, funding was co-negotiated because we went through the Partnership Advisory Group – 
PAG – of Building the Bridge. If we wanted to fund a particular project it would have to go back 
to the Executive Board which had community representatives on just for ratification. Me and 




one or two others always made sure that I was accountable to my seniors and that everything 
we funded was agreed and we kept records of the funding. 68 
The Chair told us that his most important objective was to make sure that everybody was given an 
opportunity to express their views. He further elaborated that a key concern for him and the Vice-
Chair was that negotiation and decision processes were transparent and generated trust: 
Due to the structure that was in place we would discuss everything at Board level, so it 
wouldn’t go past me or over my head or behind me, it had to get through the Chair. Nothing 
was secretive in any way, it was very transparent, and I would make sure that that was the case 
– it was essential to me because that’s what we campaigned for, transparency and trust were 
core aspects of Building the Bridge and remain to this date.  
Both Chairs, Zaheer Shabir and Mohammed Elsharif, felt that Building the Bridge gave them an 
opportunity to convey community concerns to the authorities and process joint work on this basis. 
Both also perceived Building the Bridge as a collective effort in which everybody involved was 
genuinely open to other views and concerns, and that authorities, including the Police, were 
persuaded on a few crucial occasions to revise their initial plan or practices.  
Conclusion 
While we shall return to examples of such debates in the section on Prevent funded activities, we 
now briefly recap our findings regarding the institutional structure of Building the Bridge. The process 
that led to the establishment of Building the Bridge was driven by the recognition that the 
participation of Muslim community representatives was an essential and constitutive feature of the 
implementation of Prevent in Bristol. Although inspired and initiated by a political agenda that was 
pre-defined by central government, the individuals involved in creating Building the Bridge envisaged 
and advanced a collaborative approach, which was characterised by a preparedness to arrive – to the 
degree possible – at a joint understanding of locally specific problems and potential collective 
solutions. While the Police and Bristol City Council felt they needed persuasion to arrive at a shared 
understanding with Muslim communities, they were open to including Muslim representatives’ 
contributions and problem perceptions. From the outset, Muslim community representatives were 
involved in designing Building the Bridge, not only through their presence at the table, but also by 
shaping its institutional design. The initiators within the Police were reflexive about pre-existing 
power-imbalances and ready to share institutional power with community representatives. This was 
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not only reflected in the symbolic change of name from ‘Prevent Programme Board’ to ‘Building the 
Bridge’; several mechanisms were put in place, which enabled community ownership of Building the 
Bridge, including agenda setting capacities, community leadership, and institutional representation 
within a novel advisory board. These various institutionalised roles of Muslim participants constituted 
a distinctive feature of the implementation of Prevent in Bristol and contributed to generating trust 
among those involved.  
Perhaps because Building the Bridge emerged through participatory mechanisms, there was an early 
recognition that participation and inclusion needed to be widened and diversified. We now turn to a 








4. Building the Bridge as a mechanism 
for representation of Muslims 
Questions of who is able to represent or speak on behalf of any religious or ethnic group are typically 
heated,69 and this has certainly been true in relation to questions of Muslim representation. O’Toole 
et al (2013) have shown that over the last few decades there has been much better recognition on 
the part of government that Muslims are a diverse community – ethnically, theologically and socially 
– and that reliance on a small group of community leaders does not allow for the effective 
representation of such diversity. In Bristol, the implications of the demographic changes among the 
local Muslim population that we outlined in Section 2 were cited as a concern for the 
representativeness of Building the Bridge by those involved in it. Participants were keenly aware that 
a diverse range of groups needed to be included within Building the Bridge. There was recognition 
that individual Muslim participants should not be assumed to be speaking for all Muslims, and that 
inclusion and representation required ongoing work and communication. 
Addressing Muslim diversity 
The most challenging task, according to the inaugural chair of Building the Bridge, Latif Ismail, was to 
gain an accurate and comprehensive representation of various Muslim voices across Bristol. While 
Bristol City Council and the Police drew on substantial networks, they were also advised to extend the 
circle of participants as widely as possible. Mohammed Elsharif, the Vice-Chair of Building the Bridge, 
perceived the Partnership Advisory Group as a unifying platform which also reflected the ethnic and 
religious diversity of Bristol’s Muslim population:  
In the past there’s no one unified Muslim voice in the city, so you’ve got the Bangladeshi 
community, you’ve got Somalis, you’ve got the Sudanese, Pakistanis, and so on, but now we’re 
one community, so we sit in a room and we’ve got 50 people from different backgrounds, for 
the Mayor to come and see that, how many votes are behind that.  
Several interviewees also highlighted that Building the Bridge not only created a regular dialogue 
between public authorities, statutory agencies and Muslims, but further institutionalised the on-
going conversation between different mosques and Muslim organisations in the city. Shabana Kausar, 
who at the time worked as a Community Development Officer for Bristol City Council, explained:  
It didn’t create discussions, but it helped to facilitate existing conversations taking place in the 
city. Building the Bridge was valuable, because it provided a safe space for different 
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communities to come together and address internal issues. The Muslim community is 
incredibly diverse, so providing a space for the congregations of all 13 Mosques was very much 
needed. Building the Bridge was successful in coordinating the existing work happening across 
the city.   
Zaheer Shabir and Mohammed Elsharif, the Chair and Vice-Chair, both felt that Building the Bridge 
not only enabled them to express and address community concerns within the BTB Board and the 
Partnership Advisory Group, but that their role within Prevent subsequently led to further 
opportunities to speak on behalf of the Muslim community in other forums and arenas. Both chairs 
or Zaheer Shabir were, for instance, subsequently invited to join bodies such as the Independent 
Advisory Group to the Police, the Standing Advisory Council on Religious Education (SACRE), Bristol’s 
Education and Attainment Partnership (BEAP), the BME Voice and Influence Steering Group, the 
Queens’ Diamond Jubilee Steering Group and the Tension Monitoring Group. These appointments 
created working relationships that in Shabir’s view contributed to nurturing mutual understanding 
and reducing access barriers to local authorities. They also opened up further opportunities to enter 
into a dialogue with a range of public authorities, including the Legacy Commission, the Bishop of 
Bristol, the office of the Lord Lieutenant or the Lord Mayor’s office.  
Research participants’ accounts showed that they felt represented by the two Chairs in key areas of 
the debate, and that they had a sense they could bring up important issues that needed discussing. 
Several respondents stressed that the Chair(s) put their ‘heart and soul’ into Building the Bridge and 
thereby contributed to the quality of the dialogue. Interviewees also pointed out that elected 
representatives could never fully represent a community as a whole, however, and even if a number 
of representatives spoke for different sub-sections of the Bristol Muslim population, there was a 
need for an on-going exchange with the wider constituency. Rizwan Ahmed, a community 
development worker and project manager at one of the oldest Muslim organisations in Bristol, the 
Bristol Muslim Cultural Society, argued:  
What we always say to people – you will never get 
through to the whole of the Muslim community by 
talking to me, or by talking to such and such, it’s 
just not going to happen, that’s not how the 
community works, unfortunately, it’s just not 
realistic. You can talk to me and you will get 
through to a certain part of the community, you 
talk to such and such and you get through to a 
different part, etcetera.  What ideally needs to be 
done is to map out the whole community and then 
you will get through to everybody, which is not 
going to happen by speaking to one or two of us.  
In this light, the strength of Building the Bridge was the engagement of the chairs, which made 
Muslim concerns audible beyond the BTB board, and their ability to draw on regular consultations 
with the wider Muslim community within the Partnership Advisory Group. 




Organisational capacity across Muslim groups 
A number of research participants reflected on the fact that Zaheer Shabir is a member of the Council 
of Bristol Mosques, an umbrella body that unites a number of Bristol mosques associated with and 
frequented by the Pakistani community. Representatives of the Council of Bristol Mosques were 
frequently attending Building the Bridge meetings. While respondents mentioned that it was helpful 
in terms of representativeness that the Vice-Chair had a Sudanese background, many perceived 
Building the Bridge as an institution that was dominated by representatives of Pakistani mosques. 
Latif Ismail saw this as a structural feature and related it to the different communities’ duration of 
settlement and ‘know-how’:  
So I think Prevent generally addressed the diversity in the Muslim community, and in Bristol it 
has addressed it to an extent but I would still say that Building the Bridge is dominated by the 
Asian sub-continentals, especially Pakistanis, so they benefited more. It’s not because the 
authorities prefer them, it’s because they’re better organised, they’ve been here longer and 
they’re able to speak the language and they have the know-how.  
Other participants in PAG meetings, such as Sheila El-Dieb, a member of the Bristol Muslim Women’s 
Network, reflected on the structural constraints that smaller community organisations face, for 
instance the Kurdish community:  
It takes time! […] They don’t have their own buildings you see, they got turned down for 
mortgages and things like that. […] They still have to rent which means they are more inferior 
in their minds’ position, so they have to fight a little bit harder to keep their own identity […] 
Somalis didn’t come on board as well to start with, it took time, but they are very on board 
now.  
Respondents explained that even if Somali, Kurdish or other smaller minority organisations lacked 
capacities to regularly attend PAG meetings, individual members within the more established Muslim 
community maintained good personal relationships with individuals within these communities. The 
Council of Bristol Mosques (CBM) reported that in such individual encounters, a variety of mosques in 
Bristol had expressed their approval and perception that the CBM attended ‘on their behalf’. Tahir 
Mahmood explained: 
The Council of Bristol Mosques may be perceived as Pakistani organisation, although some of 
the Somalian mosques we invited to come on board said “We thought we were already on 
board and you were representing us.” So a lot of mosques, even though they were not 
participating, felt they were being represented by the Council of Bristol Mosques.  Those 
mosques that were not attending meetings felt represented as the CBM was present at the 
meetings.   
While interview data suggests that this claim was not universally shared by representatives of 
mosque committees who are not members of the CBM, the CBM leadership also clarified that the 
CBM was open to receive new members and was not constituted on the basis of ethnic membership. 
Abdul Tariq, the Vice-chair of the CBM, explained:  




The Council of Bristol Mosques has only recently received a new membership application from 
a mosque, which has been accepted. Our doors are open to all mosques - provided they have a 
permanent address and their own constitution, and are happy to accept the CBM’s 
constitution. There is no restriction in terms of ethnicity or related categories.  
Engagement ‘refusers’ 
Research participants reported that some mosques did not get as involved with Building the Bridge as 
others. Among those that did not engage, some lacked institutional capacities, while others felt that 
participating in Building the Bridge made it more difficult for Muslims to distance themselves from 
outside perceptions of Muslims as associated with political terrorism. The rationale for the latter 
argument was that collaboration implied the acceptance that Al-Qaeda type terrorism was a problem 
that emerged from within the Islamic faith, which linked it to religious practice more generally, as 
opposed to treating it as a socio-political phenomenon that affected a small minority that was hardly 
connected to the overall Muslim community. Another group that actively refused engagement was to 
be found among the Salafi mosques that embrace a more conservative understanding of Islam. 
Ironically, perhaps, it was nonetheless one such mosque that had expressed concerns to the police 
about Isa Ibrahim’s activities. As one respondent told us:  
I would think a lot of the Somali organisations were very engaged. […] There were some 
mosques that didn’t. And I guess that was more around, I suppose, Somali mosques. But again 
they are the mosques that are very Salafi in their ideology, very extreme interpretations, 
conservative interpretations. They don’t engage with anybody. So it didn’t matter. But they 
were the ones that did phone up and report Andrew Ibrahim.  
It is worth noting that the reluctance of some religious groups to engage in governance initiatives 
should not be read as an indicator of violent extremism. As Maleiha Malik has argued, it is ‘important 
to distinguish religio-political groups that are extremist from religious groups who choose to separate 
themselves from mainstream society because they are orthodox.’ Such groups may be illiberal, but 
their ‘main concern will be to sustain a way of life for its own members and to reproduce that culture 
or faith for future generations.’70 More generally, a reluctance to engage in governance has been 
noted among many other faith groups, who view their purpose for coming together as primarily 
spiritual (to engage in prayer for example), rather than social, or wish to socially engage whilst 
maintaining a critical distance from governance.71 
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Representation of Muslim diversity within Building the Bridge 
Building the Bridge, however, was not only designed to create better relationships between the 
police, and Muslim community groups, which in turn would enable conversations about potential 
suspects, embedded within Building the Bridge was the Prevent agenda’s aim of capacity and 
resilience building within Muslim communities in order to enhance their capacity to counter violent 
extremism. This aim included promoting moderate groups that offer an alternative to extremist 
readings of Islam, and engaging groups within the Muslim community, whose voices are less often 
heard, such as women and young people. The timing and location of Partnership Advisory Group 
meetings were rotating to allow for maximum attendance and participation by a variety of Muslim 
viewpoints, including young people, women, men and older community members.  
Engaging young people 
A notable feature of Prevent nationally and elsewhere was its emphasis on engagement with young 
people, driven by perceptions that reliance on community leaders disenfranchised young people, and 
thus failed to connect with those vulnerable to radicalisation. At the national level this led to the 
establishment of the Young Muslims Advisory Group (YMAG) in 2008, and locally there was a focus 
on youth engagement for Prevent funding.  
The involvement of young people in Building the Bridge, which will be discussed in greater detail in 
section 5, was perceived as an initiative that could have been taken further still. Waliur Rahman, one 
of the founders of the initially Bangladeshi, and later multi-ethnic youth organisation BAYS (Bristol 
Active Youth Service), and also a member of the YMAG, felt that the institutional structure and nature 
of exchanges within Building the Bridge were not designed to explicitly involve young people and 
address their needs: 
So as Building the Bridge formed and started 
to develop and shape and mould, what I often 
found was the guys from BAYS, and especially 
the young people just thought it’s not fit for 
me, they felt we’re just here for the sake of 
being here. ‘I give my opinion and it’s not 
really listened to.’ I don’t think they fully 
understood how to engage with young 
people. […] I’d say ‘well I can’t do it for 
everybody, you’ve got to have it embedded in 
your procedure, it has got to be part of the 
culture of that environment. Are there young 
people engaged in mosque committees?’ No, 
not really, you just have to look in Bristol and 
see what the demographics of a mosque 
committee is, elderly, 50 plus, male, South 
Asian, unless it’s a mosque that is 
predominantly attended by Somalis. 





Nationally, Prevent emphasised engagement with Muslim women, largely, Katherine Brown argues, 
because government tended to view Muslim women as inherently moderating forces, who could, 
with support, be enabled to provide more liberal readings, and alternatives to combative masculinist 
versions, of Islam. This led to the creation of the National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group 
(NMWAG) in 2008, with a particular remit to enable women’s theological engagement, and support 
for initiatives locally aimed at engagement with and empowerment of Muslim women. This approach 
was criticised – indeed the NMWAG broke down acrimoniously in 2010, with many women members 
criticising the tokenistic nature of its engagement with women. Katherine Brown suggests that a key 
flaw of the government’s focus on engaging with Muslim women was its instrumental view of 
women’s involvement as significant for delivering on the counter-terrorism agenda, rather than in 
terms of wider objectives relating to equality or empowerment, which positioned women as peace-
makers, rather than as citizens or political actors in their own right.72 A key concern for Building the 
Bridge was inclusion of Muslim women as participants. As we discuss in the following section, the 
activities organised by and for women within Building the Bridge went beyond a narrow focus on 
women as peacemakers in a variety of ways. However, interviews with Building the Bridge 
participants also indicated that the modalities of women’s participation and involvement in decision-
making processes remains a salient point of discussion and subject of on-going negotiation within 
Bristol’s Muslim community.   
Mohammed Elsharif, the vice-chair, stressed that the very structure of Building the Bridge, and 
especially the Partnership Advisory Group, involved a similar number of men and women, which 
introduced a level of equality and empowerment for women:  
Just being there as a strong voice within the table where you’ve got mosques and you’ve got 
men who traditionally work separately, just having that equal voice within that context, I think 
that’s a big, you know, empowerment for women.  
Shabana Kausar, who at the time worked for Bristol City Council, but was also a member of the 
government’s national Young Muslims Advisory Group, perceived Building the Bridge as an 
opportunity for the empowerment of both women and young people:  
From the first few community Prevent meetings I went to, it became clear that the definition of 
the ‘Muslim community’ in reality meant ‘Muslim men.’ I found that these men were often 
self-appointed community leaders who began to be the face of the Prevent agenda – women 
and young people had little or hardly any representation. It was interesting, because women 
and young people were at a double disadvantage where both Muslim men and the local 
authority failed to encourage them to shape the Prevent agenda. So it was quite refreshing 
when, at the insistence of the female Prevent lead, there was a real emphasis on creating 
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separate groups for young people and Muslim women. There were definitely continuing 
attempts by the community to keep the agenda male dominated, but it was great that Building 
the Bridge supported this work. The Prevent agenda did eventually encourage young people 
and women to be actively involved, but this was a while in coming, and arguably, did not go far 
enough.  
Several research participants, both male and female, also reported that activities that problematised 
gender-based barriers for women generated a degree of tension between some of the mosque 
representatives and feminist activists involved in Building the Bridge. Kalsoom Bashir, who founded 
the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network and also works with the Feminist Muslim Human Rights 
Organisation ‘Inspire’, found that some of her ideas, including a film that she co-produced for the 
national newspaper The Guardian,73 were received critically by some community members. The key 
issues that women who joined the Bristol branch of the Muslim Womens’ Network wanted to discuss 
included women’s religious authority in offering contemporary interpretations of the Qur’an, 
women’s role within practices of worship and ritual leadership as well as their decision-making 
capacities in religious bodies. Kalsoom Bashir pointed out that the women involved in the Muslim 
Womens’ Network felt that womens’ engagement in the city in general, but also in mosque 
communities in particular continued to face obstacles:   
Actually I was just challenging theology, patriarchal interpretations of faith and access of 
women to mosques.  And they didn’t like that. On a statutory level many mosque 
representatives are fine, but regarding women’s rights some of them are the same as the 
organisations that they represent really. 
Practices of accommodating women vary indeed considerably across Bristol mosques, and 
mosque committees adopt distinct decision-making procedures. While it is impossible to give a 
full overview of these practices within the scope of this study, the salience of the subject shall be 
illustrated with examples from established and recently created mosques in Bristol. Despite their 
varying approaches to women’s participation, there was agreement among mosque committee 
representatives in Bristol that their organisational features had been shaped by the migration 
experience and their minority position in a historically Christian and secular country. Volunteers 
involved in the more established mosques traced their organisation’s history back to an initially 
largely male migrant population, which predominantly adhered to the ‘myth of return’ and hence 
established basic and spatially confined provisional worship facilities, such as for instance, in the 
case of the oldest mosque in Bristol in Montpelier, Islami Darasgah, which is located in a terraced 
house. The need for additional facilities for women arose with growing family unification and 
marriage migration towards the end of the 20th Century. Several mosques in Bristol have raised 
money to either transform recently acquired, larger buildings or newly built ones, and mosque 
volunteers highlighted that the improvement or creation of facilities for women was at the core of 
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these building works. Representatives of mosques in Bristol related a lack of women’s spaces to 
financial constraints and the exceptionality of the post-migration experience, and highlighted that 
mosques in their country of origin provided space for both sexes. Muslim experiences across 
Western contexts vary in this regard, as Muslim migrants to the USA addressed the initial lack of 
space by creating integrated prayer spaces, and replicated traditional spatial arrangements once 
they had settled more permanently and began raising funds for expanded worship facilities.74   
The following citations indicate a spectrum of roles that different mosque communities and their 
current leadership envisage for women and shows how different Islamic communities and leaders 
draw on a spectrum of visions for women’s practices of worship and their religious authority as 
well as their influence in decision-making processes. While some mosque representatives 
associate female leadership with the private sphere, which includes educational and caring duties, 
others see it as a driving force behind local community politics. The spaces associated with 
women’s engagement and plans to institutionalise their involvement differ accordingly within 
these accounts.  
Tahir Mahmood of Islami Darasgah Bristol, for example, emphasised women’s role as educators 
and located female leadership within educational facilities. In his view, women were unlikely to 
get involved in a management committee if the mosque itself was not yet able to cater for them:    
Unless the mosques organise activities and have facilities fully open to women, women are not 
going to get involved in all male committees. We are currently constructing new buildings to 
provide facilities for women and our youth, but it’s a struggle raising the funds - but we will 
hopefully get there. We have committed to having a crèche, to having ladies’ facilities and the 
next step is to get those ladies involved in running these facilities. 
All interviewees representing mosque communities in Bristol stressed that prayers were 
obligatory for men, while women were not required to pray at the mosque. Women nevertheless 
attended prayers, albeit in lower numbers. There was agreement that women tended to attend 
social functions, including lectures and speeches. Manzoor Hussein, one of the Trustees at the 
Hosseinieh Foundation in Eastville, argued:  
Ladies’ attendance is usually better when we have religious functions and not prayers. Also 
they have children with them up to the ages of ten, so they need more space.  We have built 
that in the mosque when we structured our building. We encourage women to come and bring 
their children.  We feel that the mosque is a place of education and also a place of connecting 
spiritually.  If the adults remain disconnected from the mosque, the children will also be 
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disconnected from the mosque, so therefore they will not have the affinity with their place of 
worship.  
 
In relation to women’s involvement in mosque committees, Hussein argued that women were 
represented through their spouses.  His narrative allocates different spheres of engagement to 
women and men, implying the latter were the ones engaged in worship in the mosque, whereas 
women’s interest focused on religious gatherings. His narrative sees women’s voice being 
represented by their husbands, thereby implying they did not require direct representation:   
We have to bear that in mind this is part of the modesty aspect within the Islamic teachings 
and structure that women are not directly represented in mosque committees. However, 
that’s not to say that we don’t have women also voicing their opinions, which can be heard in 
sub-committees. In our mosque, they do voice an opinion and I’m sure they do in other 
mosques as well.  At the end of the day, it’s their husbands and families which are funding the 
mosques so the wife may not directly be voicing her opinion in the mosque but through her 
husband, we manage to hear all her concerns.  
Similarly highlighting women’s role as wife, mother and educator, Abdul Tariq, Liason Officer at 
Easton Islami Darasgah in Greenbank suggested:  
Islam gives a lot of importance to this.  The first school for a child is his mother’s lap, the child 
will learn more from the mother than it will from the father. If you make that woman weak, 
that lady weak, who is the mother, then you’ve made that child weak, so you’ve made the 
society weak.  It’s very important, education is a must. 
His mosque, the Easton Islami Darasgah has recently moved to larger facilities, and is currently 
transforming this building into to a mosque and educational centre. The part of the building that 
will be used by women in the future is currently used as a prayer space for men, but will be 
available to women upon completion of the ongoing construction works. Tariq suggested that his 
mosque was also planning to set up a separate committee for women, which will feed into the 
decision-making of the currently existing 
committee. He reasoned:  
So, this is where I think credit needs to be 
given. People are moving forward, people 
are doing that.  If the system encourages 
those then others will see, okay it can be 
achieved. (…) It is in the interests of Muslim 
community itself to empower women.  It is 
our interest, it is our aim, it’s got to be done, 
this is our future, it must happen. What I’m 
saying is that this is the grand reality, it’s 
going that way.  
 




A more recently established organisation, the Tawfiq Masjid and Centre in Barton Hill, is drawing on 
this model and operates with two separate committees, a male and a female committee, which also 
held regular joint meetings. Khalif Abdirahman, the chair of its mosque committee, told us that it was 
women in the area who mobilised in favour of having a mosque nearby, and that the mosque was set 
up in response to their initiative. In his perception, women had a greater need for a mosque in Barton 
Hill because it provided them with a communal space:  
Men have their coffee shops where they meet and discuss Somali politics, whereas it’s the 
women who look after the real needs of the community, and care about local issues, so it was 
women who wanted a social venue to meet. Mosques would not necessarily play this role in 
Somalia, but they definitely do here. Women were the driving force behind the mosque in 
Barton Hill.   
These narratives show that mosques across Bristol are currently developing some novel approaches 
to involving women in their decision-making procedures. The committee of Easton Jamia Mosque on 
St. Marks Road reached out to women candidates in the last election. Arif Khan, a member of its 
committee, and the chair of the Council of Bristol Mosques, pointed out that women had full access 
to the premises of his mosque and had their respective study and discussion circles. He asserted:   
They're more than welcome and I don't think you’ll find a single woman who said that she 
wanted to participate or become one of the mosque committee members and we refused. 
Whilst these more specific questions of women’s roles within community and religious structures in 
Bristol more broadly are outside of the scope of this study of Building the Bridge, its emergence as an 
issue within our data signals its significance as a topic of ongoing discussion and negotiation (as it has 
been in other religious, social and political contexts). Building the Bridge provided participatory 
opportunities for women and offered a forum for the ongoing dialogue about women’s involvement 
in other decision-making spaces in the city. As Jones et al (2014) suggest, although prevailing 
discourses tend to depict Muslim women as politically and socially marginalised, community 
organisations have become a key portal for women’s participation and in some cases leadership – 
and particularly those that are based on harnessing a spectrum of different forms of expertise.  
Engaging across social class 
A few respondents expressed a concern that key debates took place within the circles of Building the 
Bridge itself, but had only limited reach beyond the BTB Board or PAG. Suad Abdullahi, at the time a 
Bristol City Council community worker, who participated in Building the Bridge meetings, also raised 
the issue of elite representation. She felt that the individuals involved were not necessarily 
representative of the wider Muslim community, especially regarding their educational and class 
background:  
I think the people who were running it were very positive, very forward thinking people, but 
because they’re professional and well educated they might be in a minority within their own 
community. So within the overall community they’re probably the elite, you know. And I am 
not sure they come in touch with real issues, such as mental health and poverty, lack of 
education, all these kind of things, which then can lead to isolation and moving away from 




mainstream … and that’s when you’re most at risk of becoming involved in terrorist activities 
because you’re looking for a group, you’re looking for recognition, you’re looking for 
somewhere to belong because you don’t really belong, you know. 
Several research participants expressed concerns that Building the Bridge could have been advertised 
more widely, and that attempts to reach wider audiences could have been taken further still. 
Manzoor Hussein of the Hosseinieh Foundation in Eastville suggested: 
Outside that immediate circle, I don’t think that information filtered down to the general 
public, them to be aware of what was happening because it was very small and localised.   
Conclusion 
The interview data indicated that the initiators of Building the Bridge were conscious of and self-
critical about the challenges that representation involved, but also that the representativeness of the 
organisation could have been expanded in key respects, most notably regarding ethnicity and class. A 
variety of perspectives was included throughout the process, but some Muslims groups in the city 
chose not to engage with Building the Bridge, while others felt that their voice was not sufficiently 
considered within the forum. Building the Bridge set out to challenge pre-existing power imbalances, 
mainly by reaching out to women and young people and embedding a dialogue with these 
constituencies in its very structure. However, these groups also felt that the sensitivity and 
responsiveness to their concerns could have been more encompassing. In particular, the Bristol 
Muslim Women’s network argued that women’s problem perceptions were not given full attention 
by all participants and that there was too little scope for a shift in pre-existing opinions among some 
community members. While all research participants reported that Building the Bridge had improved 
their networks within the Muslim community, meetings also brought a spectrum of different needs 
and opinions among participants to the fore. Moving on from the challenges that inevitably arise 
when an institution is designed to give voice to a diverse and multi-faceted group, the following 
chapter sketches the activities initiated and funded by Building the Bridge, which also intended to 
reach wider audiences beyond attendants of the BTB Board and the Partnership Advisory Group.  
 
  




5. Key debates and initiatives  
The possibilities for citizens or communities to achieve institutional or legislative recognition for the 
issues that concern them can be analysed by focusing on a) the capacities of citizens or communities 
to effectively articulate and mobilise around their concerns in order to make claims on the political 
system; and b) the openness of the political system in providing opportunities for these claims to 
achieve institutional or legislative recognition and accommodation. As Modood has argued, in the UK 
over the last few decades, Muslim organisations have become increasingly organised and engaged in 
claims-making, whilst multicultural policies have opened the political opportunity structure to 
recognising and accommodating Muslim claims.75 This has been reflected in accommodations, such 
as modification of dress codes or uniforms, the provision of halal food in public institutions such as 
prisons, hospitals or schools, provision for Muslim burial, state funding for Muslim faith schools, or 
planning permission for the building of mosques. 
In this section, we consider the kinds of issues and concerns raised by Building the Bridge participants 
and the extent to which Building the Bridge created a new political opportunity structure that 
enabled issues and claims of Muslims in Bristol to be recognised or accommodated. We begin with 
the themes which Building the Bridge participants perceived as significant in joint debates, focusing in 
particular on topics that were central for the Partnership Advisory Group. This section also offers an 
account of the activities that were initiated with the help of the funding that Building the Bridge was 
able to access via the Prevent programme.   
Key debates and issues 
A key thread within PAG discussions focused on the cultural pluralisation of public services in Bristol, 
and the need for a greater cultural sensitivity in their delivery. The PAG served as a platform for 
community representatives to problematise, for instance, a police proposal to publicise the role of 
the mosque that had alerted the Police about Isa Ibrahim’s behaviour, the modalities of airport 
controls at Bristol airport, the lack of provision in the area of Islamic burials, and the policing of traffic 
around mosques during Friday prayers. In all these cases, Muslim representatives felt that their 
perspective was not initially considered in the delivery of these policies, but that Building the Bridge 
offered a mechanism that enabled them to challenge culturally insensitive practices and initiate their 
revision. In other words, Building the Bridge created a new ‘political opportunity structure’ for 
Muslim claims-making in the city, that enabled certain issues to be aired and addressed. 
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Public follow-up by the Police to the arrest of Isa Ibrahim 
An early instance where Building the Bridge participants were consulted about issues relating to 
Muslims in the city concerned a plan by the Police to follow up the arrest of Isa Ibrahim by publicly 
demonstrating their gratitude to the mosque that had 
alerted the Police to Isa Ibrahim’s behaviour. Initially, 
the Police had suggested hanging posters throughout 
the neighbourhood of Easton, in which they would 
thank the mosque that had passed on key 
information that had led to Ibrahim’s arrest and the 
disruption of his plan to carry out a bomb attack. 
Muslim representatives felt, however, this was not an 
appropriate strategy to show gratitude and suggested 
to the Police that they choose more subtle means to 
express their appreciation, by, for instance, making a 
donation to the mosque’s playground. Although the 
police officers had already taken first steps to realise 
their plans, they were persuaded that the campaign 
could be counterproductive and decided against 
running it.  
Operation of airport security controls 
The second occasion on which Muslim community members were able to intervene successfully was 
in the area of intrusive controls at Bristol airport. The introduction and use of Schedule 7 powers 
under the Prevention of Terrorism Act to ‘stop, search and examine people at ports or airports in 
order to determine whether they are concerned with the commission, preparation or instigation of 
an act of terrorism’76 have in practice been a source of controversy, with many Muslim travellers 
complaining of being routinely subjected to enhanced surveillance.77 The introduction of body image 
scanners has also proved controversial for many Muslims – particularly in relation to issues of 
modesty.  
Sheila El-Dieb, a community activist and member of the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network explained 
how this had been raised and addressed in Bristol:  
… these new scanners came into the airports. It was a big problem for the Somali community at 
that time because the officials that were at Bristol airport didn’t really know much about Islam. 
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It just needs a little bit of thought […] the person at the 
scanner should be the sex of the person that’s doing it, and 
there should be a curtain behind him so people walking past 
can’t see what he’s looking at. So the Chief Superintendent, 
Julian Moss, said that’s simple enough. Let’s go up to the 
airport and talk to the authorities. And two or three of the 
group went up and explained what was going wrong. The 
hassle stopped. 
Several research participants told us about this initiative; they had 
gained a sense that their point of view was not only considered by 
the authorities, but also subsequently led to changes in policing 
practices. Further to the initial meeting at Bristol airport, 
members of the Bristol Muslim community were invited to shadow security staff and offer feedback 
on how airport controls could be improved. It was clarified that Police needed to give an explanation 
for why they chose to question an individual, and that travel related questions were appropriate, 
while further inquiries into mosque attending habits were inappropriate in this context. Thus, while 
this negotiation process in its local scope was not equipped to challenge the structural discrimination 
that use of Schedule 7 and Section 44 stop and search procedures imply,78 consultation with the local 
Muslim community at least enabled a change to the modalities of these controls.    
Muslim bereavement and burial 
Another topic discussed in PAG meetings was the issue of bereavement and burial services in Bristol, 
which were perceived as not yet sufficiently addressing Islamic requirements. There was a sense that 
Islamic communities could introduce new collaborations among themselves to improve the way 
these services were currently delivered. While the discussion about suitable burial sites across Bristol 
and the scope of collaboration between different mosques is still ongoing, research participants 
appreciated that the issue had been initiated within Building the Bridge.  
Initiatives 
The following sections will discuss those activities that figured most prominently in interviewees’ 
narratives and can thus be seen as creating a legacy among those who were at the frontline of 
Building the Bridge activities.  
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Educational and outreach initiatives 
Social projects that were pursued within Building the Bridge, drawing on Prevent funding, included 
educational measures to ‘challenge extremist ideology and support mainstream voices’,79 such as 
presentations to school staff and students as well as conferences and workshops about the roots of 
radicalisation. Within Building the Bridge this also led to initiatives to present more positive 
representations of Muslims. The inaugural Chair, Latif Ismail, suggested setting up a picture exhibition 
that was also circulated as a printed brochure and displayed online. It contained a celebration of 
ordinary Muslims in different areas of Bristol, giving insights into their professional backgrounds and 
views on Islam and highlighting individual contributions to the local community. The exhibit was on 
display in Bristol Central Library and Easton Community Centre and received extensive coverage by 
local and national media; it also won several awards, including the West of England Chartered 
Institute of Public Relations Award and the Community Cohesion Institute’s Public Engagement 
Award for Building Bridges. Mosque committee members furthermore participated in excursions to 
other mosques across the UK, including Tower Hamlets, Leicester, Leeds and Bradford, which were 
perceived as a beneficial exchange of experiences and good practice.  
The Police drew on Building the Bridge as a forum to consult the Muslim community about the design 
of training tools that they had been developing to inform wider audiences, including statutory 
agencies and educational institutions, about possibilities of early interventions. These training 
materials, funded through separate funding that Avon and Somerset Police had secured, included 
short films designed for diverse viewers, which were delivered by trained staff in participatory 
training workshops. The training material drew on extensive research on the case of Isa Ibrahim (and 
others); the short film ‘Conviction’, for instance tells the story of Ibrahim’s path to radicalisation and 
flags up key situations in which health or social care providers as well as educational authorities could 
have become concerned and looked to explore the reasons for his behaviour. Another training 
package called ‘WRAP’ (Workshop to Raise Awareness of Prevent) was designed for statutory bodies 
and their partners. ‘Conviction’ has subsequently become established as a national training tool and 
also been used in other European countries. Detective Chief Inspector Martyn Triggol, the Police’s 
coordinator for Prevent across the South West, suggested that Building the Bridge helped to fill a 
significant gap in the area of education, awareness training and early recognition. The educational 
tools intend to clarify to practitioners how radicalisation proceeds and suggest indicators ‘to look out 
for, what to be concerned about’. The WRAP training package has been analysed in greater detail by 
Blackwood, Hopkins and Reicher, who contend that a number of over-simplified social-psychological 
assumptions informed its understanding of radicalisation as connoting alienation from the 
mainstream and vulnerability to recruitment by extremists.80 The training package, Blackwood et al 
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argue, constructs discrimination as an individual-level experience, and at the same time encourages 
yet more attention on Muslims within statutory bodies and public institutions. Thus institutionalised 
discrimination is not only not sufficiently problematised as part of the political ground on which 
radicalisation becomes possible, but potentially even reinforced.  
Youth engagement and Proud 2B 
Another set of activities was intended to ‘support individuals who are vulnerable to recruitment by 
violent extremists’.81 These measures explicitly focused on youth engagement;82 and included the 
creation of a Muslim scout group, the organisation of various sports activities and Street Art projects 
involving graffiti artists in Southmead and Easton, as well as a series of workshops called ‘Proud 2B’.83 
The Proud 2B events were held at the City Academy in Lawrence Hill. Kalsoom Bashir initiated this 
series of events, and organised Proud 2B in collaboration with a group of young people, including 
Shabana Kausar and Waliur Rahman, who were also members of the previous New Labour 
Government’s Young Muslim’s Advisory Group (YMAG). The idea was to create safe spaces for 
discussion about young people’s experiences, but also to foster a sense of confidence, that would 
help counter stereotypes that young Muslim often face in the wider public. Apart from offering a 
forum for discussion, the events were also intended to build skills, for instance in the area of political 
engagement. Shabana Kausar told us:  
We invited speakers from London to speak to young people about how to lobby their MP, how 
to write letters, and how to be active citizens. This was really important because these are not 
skills they teach you in school. These skills are often ones which you pick up from parents and 
peers, which set the predominantly working class, BAME young people at a disadvantage. 
Middle and upper class children know how to access key policy and change makers through 
their parents and networks. We wanted our young people to learn how to influence change 
through democratic means to ensure that their concerns and opinions were being represented. 
Other activities involved drama and arts performances or discussions in small groups on issues such 
as ‘stop and search’ or ‘Women in Islam’. The Proud 2B workshops evidently marked a milestone for 
Building the Bridge participants, as a majority of respondents mentioned Proud 2B at least once 
during the interview, commenting on it as a memorable success. The Council of Bristol Mosques and 
the Somali Development Group jointly held a larger grant which was spent on employing a male and 
a female youth worker for the duration of nine months. These helped to improve networks between 
young people from different mosques in Bristol, and organised a series of sports events. When 
Prevent funding was discontinued in 2011, Bristol City Council reacted to the positive feedback by 
offering resources to the interfaith charity Salaam Shalom to deliver follow-up projects with young 
people. 
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Naseehah Community Advisory Network 
Participants in Building the Bridge felt that community members’ individual efforts to avert possible 
radicalisation processes within the community could be strengthened if they were coordinated more 
explicitly. This led to the proposal for the Naseehah Community Advisory Network, which was based 
on the understanding that the Muslim community itself could serve as a safety net, and particularly if 
a group within the community formed an advisory network that could be reached via a helpline. 
Thus, anyone concerned about a community member, who, for example, displayed unusual changes 
of behaviour or was considered ‘vulnerable’ to radicalisation could ring or email the advisory 
network. Rather than reporting a fellow Muslim, friend or family member to the police, concerned 
observers (and the individuals they were concerned about) could receive theological, psychological 
and personal advice and support from within the Muslim community. Thus, Bristol City Council, Avon 
and Somerset Police and 25 Muslim volunteers initiated the Naseehah community advisory network. 
Over the period of over a year, the 25 volunteers received training in recognising radicalisation and 
offering a counter-narrative to Al-Qaeda. Kalsoom Bashir coordinated the process on behalf of Bristol 
City Council and Lloyd Nethercott, the community police officer in Easton, helped to set up the 
website and offered technical advice to the newly appointed coordinators of the network. 
Respondents in this study perceived the initial collaboration between BCC, the Police and the 
community volunteers that led to the creation of Naseehah as marked by mutual trust and shared 
sense of purpose. Evaluating the first year of Naseehah’s activities, Bashir explained: 
Within the first few months of the launch I received five referrals directly as I had been project 
manager, three of which were passed on to the police for further investigation. One was 
passed on to a member of the group and one was signposted to relevant advice. So that I felt 
was great. Now the website is still there. I still get the odd phone call or email asking for advice. 
[…] The best thing about that is we have 25 people in Bristol that know what the risks are and 
can be called upon by members of the community or statutory partners for advice should it be 
required.  
Kalsoom Bashir told us that the idea was to draw on Prevent funding to establish the community 
advisory network, but that the network was then to be run solely by volunteer community advisors. 
Sheila El-Dieb, who volunteered with Naseehah for several years, and acted as a coordinator in its 
initial phase, stressed that ‘none of us walked away’ when the funding ceased. However, while all 
interviewees perceived the initial training period as beneficial, the network’s activities remained at a 
low level. Naseehah received very little publicity in the first place, and the communication between 
the respective Naseehah coordinators as well as between network members became rare after 
Prevent funding was discontinued. This was despite ongoing support for the initiative from senior 
police officers. Detective Chief Inspector Martyn Triggol, the Police’s regional coordinator for Prevent 
across the South West, suggested that advisory bodies such as Naseehah would benefit from 
continuing financial support so that its members could keep up to date with recent developments 
within international terrorist networks. With the discontinuation of Prevent funding for Bristol City 
Council, Kalsoom Bashir was seconded into Avon and Somerset Police as a Prevent Trainer to deliver 
the national education tools developed within Building the Bridge. In 2012, Bristol City Council and 
Avon and Somerset Police obtained funding to implement the Channel process, a Prevent-funded 




multiagency programme in which local authorities, police representatives and various statutory 
agencies collaborate in identifying and supporting individuals at risk of radicalisation. With the 
termination of Prevent funding for Naseehah, the coordinators of Naseehah decided that Channel 
would be better resourced and more up to date in dealing with referrals, and that individuals ringing 
the Naseehah helpline should be informed about Channel as a potential alternative resource. 
However, as regular Naseehah meetings had been discontinued by this time, the Naseehah 
volunteers were not briefed about this decision to rely on the Channel process. A number of 
volunteers, among them the initial coordinators of Naseehah, felt concerned about a potential 
blurring of boundaries between Naseehah, which was intended to enable a community service to 
respond to concerns about radicalisation, and the Channel process, which directly involved the local 
authority and the police in official capacities. The secondment of one of the Naseehah coordinators 
into the Police was furthermore perceived as creating a potential tension between police priorities 
and Naseehah’s relatively more independent profile. There followed a series of resignations, through 
which Naseehah volunteers asserted their concerns regarding the importance of Naseehah being 
clearly seen as a community service that  was independent of Channel and normal policing structures. 
The experience of Naseehah demonstrates the importance of collective and transparent decision-
making and continual negotiation of trust for successful collaboration between community groups, 
local authorities and the police.  
Women’s initiatives and the Muslim Women’s Network  
A series of activities sought to ‘increase the capacity of communities to challenge and resist violent 
extremists’,84 targeting mainly mosque communities, but also specifically Muslim women; Kalsoom 
Bashir, who drew on extensive and diverse community contacts established through her work as a 
teacher and community activist, organised various discussion events and forums with the local 
branch of the Muslim Women’s Network, that she had set up for this purpose.85 Activities included 
parenting courses which were ‘to explore ways in which faith and culture may affect parenting’ and 
British awareness and citizenship classes. However, the focus was not reduced to women’s role as 
mothers of potentially ‘vulnerable’ young people; the relatively broad scope of Prevent objectives 
was also used to facilitate women’s engagement and participation in a general sense. Shabana 
Kausar, a member of the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network, explained how Prevent played a role in 
enabling an on-going conversation among women within the Muslim community:  
I was really pleased that Muslim women were given a space to develop and to shape the 
agenda; we held conferences, we had workshops, we invited prominent speakers to talk about 
women’s rights. We spoke about women in Islam and what authority we have to govern 
ourselves and others. I remember speaking to Kalsoom at the time that I was quite sad that we 
needed Prevent to safe spaces to have these discussions; these conversations were already 
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happening in small clusters but lacked real coordination. You know, we have a number of 
really powerful Muslim women in our community, but our voices were just not breaking 
through into the mainstream. 
The Muslim Women’s Network sought to bring professional women together, whose voice is less 
often heard. The rationale was that grassroots community organisations speak for parts of the 
community, while the contribution and perspective of female Muslim teachers, doctors or 
magistrates are less often publicly appreciated and valued.  Kausar argued that the Muslim Women’s 
Network and its focus on theology offered an important collective source of confidence for its 
participants, the ‘powerful women’ she mentioned 
above:  
It gave us that extra confidence and knowledge. 
We needed to be able to challenge misogyny as 
and when we saw it and be equipped with the 
confidence to speak out against injustice. I think it 
was almost like giving us permission to have the 
authority to speak out, but we needed to hear it 
from Islamic scholars so that we could meet any 
backlash we were presented with. Too often 
religion was used as a tool to silence us. As a faith, 
Islam is founded on equality, but there is a 
difference between faith and religion: religion is a 
man-made institution […] and there are very 
patriarchal elements within religion which were, 
and still are, used to stifle women. We needed a safe space to come together and talk about 
how Islam actually is about the empowerment of all people and we needed to reclaim it for 
ourselves. 
While respondents reported that they had gained a sense that Building the Bridge activities 
addressed at women in particular were valuable for those involved, Bristol Community Worker Suad 
Abdullahi felt that the circle of women who actually benefitted from these initiatives was limited to 
what she perceived as women who already are fairly empowered, and with class and educational 
advantages:  
They could have worked with various women’s groups out there, the kind of grassroots people 
who make everyday decisions about forced marriage, about FGM, you know, about whether a 
woman is going to be in to education or not, you know, they weren’t tackling all that stuff.  
 
  





In summary, Bristol’s Building the Bridge 
made use of Prevent funding in such a 
way that key grievances within the 
Muslim community were aired and 
addressed to the degree possible within 
a programme whose main focus was on 
preventing terrorism. Most importantly, 
its activities were realised in cooperation 
with the Muslim community itself. The 
scope of subjects discussed at 
Partnership Advisory Group meetings 
was determined mainly by Muslim 
representatives, as was the thematic focus of key activities that were realised with the help of 
Prevent funding – within the parameters set by the national government’s guidelines and objectives. 
Participants in the PAG felt that Building the Bridge enabled them to raise public authorities’ 
awareness of community concerns and challenge culturally insensitive policing practices, such as for 
instance, security controls at Bristol Airport. In so doing, Building the Bridge created a new political 
opportunity structure for the articulation of Muslim claims, and enabled a reshaping of some 
institutional practices, which reduced some of the power imbalances between public authorities and 
Muslim representatives. While a great deal of activities reached out to wider audiences, there was 
also a sense that activities could have included an even broader array of Muslim constituencies. 
Especially women and young people felt that the thematic remit could have been expanded further, 
and that the discontinuation of funding for Building the Bridge’s activities prohibited the exploration 
of neglected subject areas.   




6. The future of Building the Bridge  
The impact of the withdrawal of Prevent funding 
 Under the current Coalition Government’s 
Prevent agenda, 86  Bristol is no longer a 
priority area for Prevent funding. The 
discontinuation of funding for activities and 
the organisation of meetings has of course 
had an impact on the institutional setup of 
Building the Bridge. Staff at Bristol City 
Council, who held full-time posts associated 
with the delivery of Prevent, have moved on 
to different tasks. A research participant 
described the current situation as follows:  
The Council’s not involved as much as 
before. The police is not involved as much 
as before. All the agencies have 
disappeared because they’re led by 
priorities and funding and they’re gone, 
but the links are there and the 
community’s there.  
Ian Quaife, at the time Community Cohesion Manager at Bristol City Council, stressed that the 
current Government’s approach to the separation between Prevent and integration shifted attention 
away from community cohesion policies, and that the work of Building the Bridge has also been 
affected by the general reduction of local authorities’ budgets in the wake of on-going public sector 
reforms. The present Government’s Prevent Strategy87 explicitly separates Prevent from community 
cohesion policies, whilst the recent integration strategy is characterised by a greater emphasis on 
Christian identity and values as ‘an important part in the heritage and culture of our nation’,88 it 
provides hardly any funding for community work and accentuates instead the role of localities, the 
private sector and civil society organisations in providing conditions for social integration. 
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Nevertheless, Bristol City Council continues to deliver some of the youth work that was put together 
under the auspices of Building the Bridge through the interfaith charity Salaam Shalom. Shabana 
Kausar, who managed the charity until recently, told us that she very much drew on her experiences 
with Building the Bridge in this role: 
Our mediation project, for instance, continues some of the work that Building the Bridge 
touched on. Working with Salaam Shalom, I can continue this important piece of work. This 
shows that Building the Bridge did have some successes because it managed to mainstream 
the different projects that were explored under Prevent. The leadership of these projects were 
taken over by members of the community, and we have made them our own and taken them 
in a direction that we feel fit. 
The women involved in the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network also continue to remain in touch with 
each other, although the lack of funding has reduced possibilities to organise larger events. Even the 
Partnership Advisory Group continues to meet, although meetings are now scheduled twice a year 
rather than every six weeks. Bristol City Council’s updated Neighbourhoods and Community Cohesion 
Strategy includes a continuing commitment to supporting the Partnership Advisory Group and 
Building the Bridge in general, and includes an annual evaluation of the PAG.89 Building the Bridge 
also has a seat as a partner on the Local Enterprise Partnership BME steering group, SARI (Stand 
against Racism and Inequality) and the Bristol Manifesto on Race Equality and Inclusion. The 
organisation maintains regular contact with the Mayors’ and the Police Crime Commissioner’s office.   
Thus, while a number of initiatives created between 2007 and 2010 are still on-going, including the 
public sector awareness training that is delivered by the Police, the Bristol Muslim Women’s 
Network, and youth work that has been taken on by publicly funded third sector organisations, such 
as the interfaith charity Salaam Shalom, the overall institutionalised cooperation that defined 
Building the Bridge, and the scale of activities that was associated with it, have been significantly 
reduced. Kalsoom Bashir felt that especially the work of Building the Bridge around women’s and 
young people’s participation was discontinued at its climax:  
So I think that is a huge loss really, because young people wanted platforms to discuss 
sexuality, relationships, hard hitting subjects that they just couldn’t do within a culturally 
sensitive environment. And we were starting to do that. But it was literally the line is drawn 
and we had to stop. So we couldn’t do it. Certainly the mosques need a huge amount of work 
still, and I’m not quite sure what the answer is there really. I saw on Facebook, a mosque just 
had an election and two people are being elected. Well how many women are elected? None.   
Bashir’s view resonates very much with many other interviewees’ assessment that key themes were 
picked up by Building the Bridge but not developed as far as they would have wished.  
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Building Bridges Beyond Prevent?  
Despite the discontinuation of funding, the Building the Bridge Chairs initiated a number of 
interventions, for instance by encouraging politically engaged young people with minority 
background to run for office at Council elections and holding hustings with all candidates for the 
offices of Mayor and Police and Crime Commissioner that focused specifically on Muslim community 
issues. During recent escalations in the conflict between Israel and Palestine, Building the Bridge co-
organized an event at which Bristol’s four members of Parliament and the Mayor discussed global 
foreign policy with the Muslim community. The Bristol MPs and the Mayor issued a joint call that 
problematized the disproportionate use of violence and appealed to the UK Government to promote 
a dialogue on establishing peace in the region.90  
Responding to the EDL 
Building the Bridge also coordinated a concerted response from Bristol’s faith communities when the 
right wing extremist English Defence League held a demonstration in Bristol in July 2012. Prior to the 
rally, a delegation including Building the Bridge chair Zaheer Shabir held a meeting with the EDL 
leadership to discuss with them their reasons for organising a march in Bristol.91 
During the meeting, the EDL was asked to explain why it had 
chosen Bristol as a location for its protest, especially as a 
majority of the local population felt that people from different 
backgrounds got on well with each other. According to Shabir, 
the EDL leaders presented a list of ten concerns about public life 
in Bristol, such as claims that there were no-go areas for non-
Muslims in the city or that Muslim communities did not engage 
with other non-Muslims, each of which was discussed and 
countered on the basis of data, or experiences and evidence 
from Building the Bridge activities. The exchange concluded with 
an invitation to the EDL leadership to continue a constructive 
dialogue with Building the Bridge. Shabir suggested that the EDL 
nearly cancelled the march in response to this meeting, and that 
lower numbers of participants than were initially expected 
turned up on the day of the march. Building the Bridge also held 
a meeting with the organisation Unite against Fascism, and 
organised gatherings with a variety of community members. 
                                                          
90 Bristol City Council (2014): Bristol leaders issue statement on Gaza conflict and ceasefire, 
http://www.bristol.gov.uk/press/bristol-leaders-issue-statement-gaza-conflict-and-ceasefire. 
91 Such a meeting was an unusual, although not completely isolated, instance of Muslim actors seeking out 
meetings with EDL representatives to counter EDL claims head on. A similar meeting also took place in Leicester 
in 2011 between the FMO’s PR Officer, Suleman Nagdi and the EDL, with Leicestershire Constabulary acting as 
intermediary. 




These discussions revealed that many in the Muslim community did not want to be involved in any 
response, reaction, or counter-protest. A leaflet was prepared that offered information for young 
people. On the day, the BTB chairs and other community volunteers policed the streets in Easton and 
Lawrence Hill to make sure young people stayed away from the march and to de-escalate possible 
tensions. According to Zaheer Shabir, who coordinated these interventions, community members 
were out on the streets all day, exchanging news over the phone and keeping a wider network up to 
date via email. On the following day, Building the Bridge paired up with the Bristol Multi-faith Forum 
and invited Muslims and non-Muslims across Bristol to join them for a Peace Walk. The Peace Walk 
was not designed as a protest against the EDL, but as a celebration of Bristol’s diversity.  
Some research participants felt that this intervention introduced a new post-Prevent focus and added 
a multi-faith profile to Building the Bridge, which was widely appreciated. Waliur Rahman, the 
founder of the youth organisation BAYS, argued:  
Building the Bridge was quick to react and get on there, meet with the police, meet with the 
council. I’m on the email list and I would get updates on what’s happening from the police 
through Building the Bridge – real time, this is what happening now, this is how many arrests 
have happened, this is where they’re moving on to, this is the bit to avoid etc., etc. So for me 
that’s a real positive and I think that’s a real big success of the community coming together and 
being informed of a potential issue. Because actually a whole group of young people could 
have mobilised, young Muslim guys could have mobilised and tried to fight them and who 
would have been on the front page of the Sun? You know, not the EDL. So there’s some good 
work in that sense about mobilising the community. 
Other research participants felt that the initiative did not go sufficiently beyond the discursive logic of 
Prevent, inasmuch as it assumed young Muslim’s vulnerability and likeliness to engage violently with 
the EDL and was intended to prevent such potential escalations. Several respondents felt that the 
danger of a violent retaliation was overstated, and that as a consequence, a Muslim voice was 
missing on the counter-march. Farooq Siddique of Easton Jamia mosque, for instance, felt the 
absence of Muslim speakers on the counter-march had sent the wrong signals: 
I believe if you don’t have the confidence or the willingness to stand up for your own rights, it’s 
only a matter of time when other people get tired of standing up for your rights. […] And to be 
honest with you, I doubt if any young Muslims would have turned up, […] or whether their 
parents would have let them turn up, or said, we don’t want to get involved in this – but I 
would have left the choice to the people. 
Regardless of how enthusiastic or critical a variety of community members felt about this 
initiative, it demonstrated that Building the Bridge is willing to engage with the current 
Government’s revised Prevent strategy, which explicitly refers to tackling right-wing extremism as 
well.92  
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Three models for Building the Bridge 
A majority of research participants felt Building the Bridge had not only created momentum, but set 
up a collaboration that was beneficial for all parties involved. Many stressed that regular exchanges 
between representatives of minority groups, statutory agencies and public authorities had created 
valuable relationships that both community members and local authorities continued to draw on. 
Farooq Siddique argued:  
I do genuinely see a future. I think it’s a crucial 
step. I think it took a long time to get there, and 
anyone who’s – as far as I know – anybody 
who’s been involved believes it should exist, in 
its current form, the way it’s set up at the 
moment. I think it we’re not taking full 
advantage of that scenario. But in terms of 
actual engagement, there is no other process. 
There is no other way that our statutory 
agencies can engage with the Muslim 
communities, for example.  
There was furthermore wide agreement among 
participants in Building the Bridge, including the two Chairs, that if Building the Bridge were to be 
continued, it required a new orientation, specifically in terms of its thematic focus, its composition 
and leadership. Farzana Saker, who works for the Multi-Faith Forum, which collaborated with 
Building the Bridge in organising the Peace Walk, suggested:  
When Building the Bridge was set up it didn’t have a constitution, it didn’t have a rolling 
steering committee. It just had people from different organisations steering it. And it obviously 
didn’t have volunteers. The group really needs to become a constituted group and take other 
people on board.  
Several interviewees felt that after five years of successful collaboration, Building the Bridge would 
benefit from a new regulatory framework that would define its purpose and structure by taking it 
beyond its initial task, that is, beyond the implementation of the Prevent Programme. Chair Zaheer 
Shabir suggested specifying a rotating leadership and identifying a clear procedure for new elections.  
Based on our data, there are different visions of how this new orientation could look, some of which 
could potentially be combined with each other. For illustrative purposes, we group these various 
visions into three models. None of the ‘models’ presented below has been identified as the only 
possible solution, and none of the individuals cited below explicitly limited their vision to just one 
model. In fact, some research participants suggested a number of variations. The reason why some 
respondents are quoted within Model A, B or C is thus indicative of the fact that the argument they 
made exemplified a key rationale of one of those models.  




Model A: a countering extremism forum 
A forum that draws on the Prevent legacy but is extended to challenge various forms of extremism 
  
The first model draws on Building the Bridge’s past profile and experience with implementing 
Prevent, but extends its remit beyond tackling Al-Qaeda terrorism to addressing other forms of 
extremism, such as right-wing political activism and recent activities by the so called Islamic State 
(ISIS).  The vision draws on the current Government’s Prevent Strategy, aiming to identify areas in 
which vulnerable young people might be responsive to violent ideologies and developing targeted 
action to prevent these people from joining radical groups. Ian Quaife, Bristol City Council’s 
Community Cohesion Manager, also told us about the announcement of Al-Shabaab, a Somalia based 
terrorist organisation, to recruit young Somalis in specific areas in the UK.93 Bristol was named as one 
of these areas for targeted recruitment. The Council felt Building the Bridge provided an appropriate 
format to address and discuss this issue:  
There are lots of perceptions, negative perceptions of Somalis, so we need to challenge some 
of that, but also to alleviate any panic in the community to say that this is … you know they 
might’ve done a video but that doesn’t mean that all young Somalis are going to become 
terrorists. But also to open that up so we can find out what the Somali community in Bristol 
think and offer help for them to tackle the issue really, if the issue exists, I am not sure if it 
does yet.  
Research participants who advocated this model felt that a new focus on all forms of extremism not 
only required a thematic reorientation, but also an extended circle of participants in Building the 
Bridge. The proposition was to maintain a focus on faith communities, but broadening it by involving 
the Bristol Multi-Faith Forum, a charity that engage faith communities across Bristol:  
There’s got to be a platform where we have different communities coming together and 
addressing those issues together. […] The Multi-Faith Forum is doing a huge amount of work in 
engaging communities, especially around the topic of extremism and other things as well. The 
work that the Partnership Advisory Group did should be handed over to this organisation 
because they’re doing such a fantastic job.  
Farzana Saker, who works for the Multi-Faith Forum, felt that Building the Bridge would benefit from 
extending its scope and board beyond the Muslim community by including other faith groups. While 
she saw her organisation’s objectives very much consistent with Building the Bridge, she suggested 
she could not take on further tasks without additional help from Building the Bridge. Joining efforts 
with Building the Bridge, she argued, would require that Building the Bridge would bring own 
resources into such an alliance.  
                                                          
93 The Bristolpost (2013) New Al-Shabaab Video Aimed at Potential Terrorist Recruits in Bristol: 
http://www.bristolpost.co.uk/New-al-Shabaab-video-aimed-potential-terrorist/story-19953144-
detail/story.html, ITV (2013) Masked Jihadist Aims Al-Shabaab Video at Potential British Recruits, 
http://www.itv.com/news/2013-10-17/masked-jihadist-aims-al-shabaab-video-at-potential-british-recruits/  




Model B: a Black and Minority Ethnic communities forum 
A consultative forum for Bristol’s black and minority ethnic communities  
 
The second model envisaged by several respondents was an extension of the existing Partnership 
Advisory Group to include a wider array of Bristol’s Black and Minority Ethnic communities, and one 
that, importantly, provided a space for established and newly settled groups. A representative of this 
group would then regularly report to the Local Strategic Partnership. Mohammed Elsharif told us that 
there was a sense of common issues among Black and Minority Ethnic communities in Bristol and a 
perception that a joint PAG membership could enable them to address shared concerns more 
effectively. In his view, an institutionalised forum could give more recent arrivals such as the Polish or 
Somali communities an opportunity to learn from more established groups, and those who are more 
established could learn from new arrivals. The forum could also draw on a wider network of working 
groups, with thematic organisation, to discuss concerns around mental health, education, 
employment, discrimination, or political participation. In the current Vice Chair’s view, such 
collaboration would reflect the profile that Building the Bridge has adopted since the discontinuation 
of Prevent funding:  
Building the Bridge has started becoming more about community cohesion, community 
empowerment, development, you know. We use the links and expertise on the board to 
develop that. […] I think that’s what we need in Bristol, is having joined up minorities. It’s not 
only to involve them in activities, but also to have a platform where they can co-ordinate with 
each other. […] We did start to set something up very informally, so we had meetings with 
Marvin Rees from the Afro-Caribbeans, invited some people from Asian communities, Somalis, 
a professional network to come together to think about what our vision for the BME 
communities is. Some people from Eastern Europe as well … it just started like an informal 
dinner, we meet every three months, just to talk and chat, but I think that’s maybe something 
we can build on with Building the Bridge. 
The rationale of this model is not primarily focused on the prevention of violent extremism, but to 
address all kinds of issues that affect minority ethnic communities in particular. Research participants 
advocating this model argued that any new Prevent Strategy would not allow for a continuation of 
the community work that made Building 
the Bridge activities so valuable, so the 
organisation should dissociate from 
Prevent all together. Sheila El-Dieb, for 
instance, suggested:  
Even if funding is made available 
under that agenda, I’m not sure that 
the new Prevent strategy is actually 
going to be useful in that way […] 
Building the Bridge should live on and 
it should spawn a lot of baby-Building-
the-Bridges and community work 
across communities, across Muslim 




and non-Muslim communities, tackle unemployment issues, food banks, all this kind of thing 
which is needed everywhere […] I don’t see the big society giving us, oh, come on, let’s give 
them some money to help the communities integrate. I don’t see that any time soon. 
Model C: a Muslim forum 
A post-Prevent Muslim forum that provides a democratic space for Muslim communities  
 
Several interviewees felt that the Partnership Advisory Group replicated organisational structures 
that had already been in place prior to its establishment. While the focus on Prevent and its funding 
stream justified the creation of the PAG, this group of respondents argued that the varied 
membership within Building the Bridge did not allow for a discussion of concerns beyond the scope of 
Prevent, especially regarding matters that concerned relationships or issues within the Muslim 
community itself. These research participants proposed that the BTB Board should be retained as a 
mechanism for Muslims’ engagement with statutory agencies, the Council or Police, but that the PAG 
should be reconstituted as a Muslim Forum. Farooq Siddique made an attempt to establish such a 
Muslim Forum in the mid-2000s, and Building the Bridge subsequently absorbed the Muslim Forum’s 
membership. The forum was intended to link Muslim organisations across Bristol, who were to meet 
every three months and discuss issues and potential solutions within a plenary and smaller working 
groups. In Siddique’s view, the board of Building the Bridge could serve as a mechanism to present 
the results of such gatherings to local authorities. The maintenance of a Muslim Forum that precedes 
BTB board meetings would require an organisational budget. The rationale of a Muslim ‘only’ Forum 
is that specific themes, such as the participation of women within mosque committees, or other 
internal matters, for instance, can be more effectively debated with this audience. The PAG, which 
was chaired by a Councillor and attended by the Police or other agencies, in contrast, offered a 
platform to discuss issues that concerned everybody present, such as airport controls, burial services 
or parking around mosques – rather than acting as a space for debates among Muslims. There was a 
sense that there are issues that particularly affect the Muslim community, and that public institutions 
require help in addressing some of these concerns appropriately. Suad Abdullahi argued:  
I think it could become a Board or a particular organisation supporting issues around Islam, 
because in today’s world there is a need for it. Working at a local level in Bristol, working with 
public agencies as well as schools, I think schools need the support more and more, especially 
teachers with the single Equality Act, there’s quite a lot of issues around promoting different 
protected characteristics, or sex education, how do you deal with that in an inner city school? 
  





This report has documented the emergence of Building the Bridge as a participatory mechanism for 
community engagement that established a new institutionalised relationship between Bristol City 
Council, the Police, statutory agencies and Bristol’s diverse Muslim community. We discussed the 
organisation’s dynamics of participation and representation, some of the key activities initiated by 
Building the Bridge, and offered some reflections on a possible future beyond its initial basis as a 
Prevent initiative.  
Bristol’s approach to implementing the previous Government’s Prevent programme has had a 
significant impact on the density of contacts and interactions between local authorities and 
representatives of the Muslim community, and thus addressed some of the deficits regarding certain 
minority communities’ political under-representation in the city, which had been diagnosed by 
previous observers.94  
Nevertheless, also embedded in the institutional set-up of Building the Bridge was a focus on one 
particular group among Bristol’s minorities – the Muslim community – and on engagement with 
Muslims under the auspices of the government’s counter-terrorism strategy. Engagement through 
Prevent nationally has been subject to widespread criticism for creating limited and securitised 
engagement between government and Muslim communities (although as we have noted, local 
responses to Prevent have varied a great deal). Although its activities were fundamentally linked to 
the overall aim of the prevention of violent extremism, Building the Bridge enabled interventions that 
addressed community grievances, and enabled the empowerment of Muslim young people, Muslim 
women, and mosque communities in the city. The initiation of a partnership with Muslim community 
representatives can thus be seen as driven by an overarching security concern, rather than 
necessarily inspired by the goal of enhancing participation in decision-making as such. Once Prevent 
funding dried out, exchanges and consultations became rarer. For a limited period of time, however, 
Prevent funding enabled a regulated form of community engagement, some of which continued even 
after the withdrawal of resources. In a unique way, and more durably than other ad hoc consultative 
bodies, Building the Bridge enabled Muslim community representatives to bring community concerns 
to public authorities’ attention and facilitated changes to local policies and policing practices.  
This report explored the extent to which Building the Bridge facilitated or inhibited a genuinely 
participatory engagement between public authorities and Bristol’s Muslim communities (for a 
reminder of the criteria we adopted, see the box on the following page).95 
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We found that public authorities recognised early on in the process that there was a need to include 
a variety of Muslim constituencies in the implementation of Prevent in Bristol, and undertook 
continuous efforts to widen and diversify this group. Several mechanisms institutionalised Muslim 
community involvement in Building the Bridge, including leadership capacities, agenda setting 
powers and institutional representation of a variety of groups in the Partnership Advisory Group. A 
dialogue with women and young people was embedded in the institutional set-up, and activities 
funded with the help of Prevent resources reached out to wider audiences in the city. While Building 
the Bridge sought to give voice to a diverse and multi-faceted constituency, a number of research 
participants expressed concern that some Muslim organisations 
received more attention within Building the Bridge than others, 
and a few Muslim groups preferred not to get involved with the 
forum. There was a sense that Building the Bridge activities 
could have expanded their remit especially with regard to ethnic 
and class based diversity.  
Although initiated by a nationally defined political agenda, the 
individuals involved in creating Building the Bridge were keen to 
establish a joint understanding of locally specific social problems 
and potential collective solutions. The schedule for Partnership 
Advisory Group meetings was decided in collaboration with 
Muslim representatives, as was the thematic focus of key 
activities that were realised with the help of Prevent funding. 
Participants in Building the Bridge felt that the forum enabled 
them to raise public authorities’ awareness of community 
concerns and challenge culturally insensitive policing practices, 
such as, for instance, security controls at Bristol Airport. Overall, 
Building the Bridge made use of Prevent funding in such a way 
that central Governments’ vague guidelines regarding ‘genuine 
or perceived grievances’96 within the Muslim community were 
addressed to the degree possible within a programme whose 
main focus was on preventing violent extremism. 
The institutional structure of Building the Bridge itself was designed to facilitate an on-going dialogue, 
and representatives reported that they felt they could challenge or influence public authorities’ 
views. The Chairs sought to create a space in which all views could be articulated and discussed. The 
scope of themes that were debated within Building the Bridge demonstrate a degree of openness to 
a wide array of subject matters; key initiatives reflected public authorities’ preparedness to revisit 
policing practices and strategies and make them more responsive to Muslim concerns. And while 
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PARTICIPATORY 
ENGAGEMENT 
1) A variety of perspectives 
is included, and these are 
reflected in the outcomes  
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for the interests of others  
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that their contributions 
are respected 
5) Pre-existing power 
imbalances are 
challenged or reduced 




tensions remained in areas in which opinions could not be shifted on either side, especially between 
some of the constituent Muslim organisations involved, Building the Bridge created a forum in which 
contentious subjects could be debated or taken to different arenas. Individuals involved in Building 
the Bridge reported that the preparedness of public authorities to share institutional power and their 
interest in representatives’ concerns and grievances were crucial for generating trust. While the 
experience of Isa Ibrahim’s case certainly assisted public authorities in making a case for the 
importance of mutual trust, research respondents reported that it was mainly their readiness to 
listen and take Muslim representatives’ views on board that helped build trusting relationships. It 
was also obvious from interviews with representatives of Bristol City Council and the Police that 
Muslim community representatives’ critical, constructive and engaged contributions were highly 
valued by public authorities and helped to build trust on their part.  
Some areas in which trust among Building the Bridge participants could have been improved was in 
relation to debates about the participation of women, young people and with respect to issues of 
representation and the maintenance of transparency. While young people were given particular 
attention in a variety of Prevent funded activities, their participation could have been embedded 
more systematically in the institutional structure of Building the Bridge. We also gained a sense from 
interviews that some well-established Muslim organisations were concerned that Building the Bridge 
was replicating or seeking to replace pre-existing organisational structures. Building the Bridge 
nevertheless helped to shift pre-existing power imbalances inasmuch as it created a novel 
mechanism of engagement between Bristol City Council, the Police, various statutory agencies and 
the Muslim community. Building the Bridge offered a new political opportunity structure for Muslim 
representatives to subject political and policing strategies to scrutiny, and to make public authorities 
aware of some of their concerns. While Bristol City Council and the Police were reflexive about pre-
existing power-imbalances and prepared to share their agenda setting power, it is regrettable that 
the interest in engaging with Muslim communities was driven first and foremost by an instrumental 
rationale, namely getting Muslim communities to collaborate in preventing violent extremism. 
However, once in place, Building the Bridge developed its own dynamics and facilitated interpersonal 
relationships that then took its activities beyond the narrow scope of Prevent. The implementation of 
Prevent thus created institutional structures which could be used in the future to further improve 
local authorities’ ability to address minority concerns.  
Whether the collaboration within Building the Bridge is continued with a new broadened thematic 
focus beyond Al-Qaeda-type extremism, or beyond the prevention of violent extremism, and whether 
the forum extends its circle of participants to include a wider Muslim constituency, or also invites 
different faith groups or ethnic minority communities to the table, it is clear that any further 
collaboration would require a new constituting moment for Building the Bridge. Such a new 
beginning would involve the provision of a specified budget, a discussion about future objectives and 
a regulatory framework, which, among other things, would specify a rotation principle and electoral 
procedure for the leadership of Building the Bridge, determine the frequency of meetings and include 
a reflection on how the representativeness of the organisation can be improved in the future.   




Technical Appendix  
Research Design, Methodology and Sample  
The research is based on documentary analysis and 22 qualitative research interviews which were 
conducted between September 2013 and June 2014. The aim of the interviews was to learn about 
the experiences and perceptions of a variety of individuals who were involved in Building the Bridge 
in different capacities, including through their work with Bristol City Council, the Police, Muslim 
organisations and community activism and volunteering. Respondents were recruited through a 
variety of channels; preliminary meetings with Bristol City Council and the chair of Building the Bridge 
provided a starting point. We contacted individuals whose names were mentioned in publicly 
available minutes of the ‘Safer Bristol’ Strategic Partnership meetings, and community 
representatives who publicly speak out about Muslim concerns in Bristol. Each interviewee was 
furthermore asked to recommend other suitable research participants (snowballing). Respondents 
were contacted by telephone or email. Interviews lasted between 30 and 100 minutes, and more or 
less followed a semi-structured interview schedule which drew on the participatory criteria discussed 
in this report. While themes started recurring after 14 interviews and we gained a sense of 
saturation, the initially intended 16 interview could not be achieved by the end of 2013. As there had 
been a high proportion of non-response to invitations to participate in a research interview, a further 
series of research interviews was conducted in spring 2014, after access had been successfully 
negotiated.  
Prior and during the interview, we guaranteed full confidentiality and the option to remain 
anonymous if research participants preferred not to be named in the report. Respondents could 
furthermore reject the recording of the conversation and choose to disclose their identities in 
relation to parts or all of their interview (or not at all). The data were fully anonymised, securely 
stored on the Bristol University Server and analysed with the help of the software package NVivo. 
Before direct quotes and references were included in the final report, we contacted each research 
participant so they could specify how and in what terms they wished to be reported. No data were 
released or published that would have permitted the actual or potential identification of research 
participants without their consent.  
  




List of interviewees 
1. Khalif A. Abdirahman, Chair of the Mosque Committee Tawfiq Masjid and Centre, Barton Hill 
2. Suad Abdullahi (Training Manager Ashley Housing Association, former ESOL Coordinator 
Community Learning West) 
3. Rizwan Ahmed (community development worker and project manager at the Bristol Muslim 
Cultural Society, Coordinator of Naseehah) 
4. Kalsoom Bashir (Founder of the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network, Project Manager at the 
Charity Inspire, and Regional Prevent Trainer at Avon and Somerset Police, previously the lead 
Prevent Officer at Bristol City Council – the respondent spoke about a time period during which 
she worked for Bristol City Council and Avon and Somerset Police but expressed her personal 
views rather than speaking as a representative of these organisations)  
5. Sheila El Dieb (Community Activist, Member of the Bristol Muslim Women’s Network) 
6. Mohammed Elsharif (Vice-Chair of Building the Bridge, NHS Health Improvement Manager) 
7. Latif Ismail (Inaugural Chair of Building the Bridge, Chair of the Bristol Somali Forum, Director of 
Transparency Solutions) 
8. Manzoor Hussein (Trustee at the Hosseinieh Foundation) 
9. Shabana Kausar (National Schools Engagement Officer at Women’s Aid, previously a Community 
Development Officer at Bristol City Council, manager of Salaam Shalom, and a member of the 
national Government’s Young Muslim Advisory Group) 
10. Arif Khan, (Chair of Council of Bristol Mosques, Easton Jamia Masjid) 
11. Tahir Mahmood, (Chair of the Mosque Committee Bristol Islami Darasgah) 
12. Julian Moss (Chief Superintendent, Head of the Criminal Investigation Department, Avon and 
Somerset Police) 
13. Lloyd Nethercott (Community Beat Manager, previously Muslim Community Liason Officer, 
Avon and Somerset Police) 
14. Janice Pearson (Prevent/Channel Coordinator for the South West Counter Terrorism Intelligence 
Unit) 
15. Ian Quaife (Community Cohesion Manager, Bristol City Council) 
16. Waliur Rahman (Community Activist, Co-founder of the Bristol Active Youth Service BAYS, 
member of the previous national Government’s Young Muslim Advisory Group) 
17. Abdul Tariq  (Vice-Chair of the Council of Bristol Mosques, Liason Officer at the Easton Islami 
Darasgah) 




18. Farzana Sakar (Development Officer Bristol Multi-Faith Forum) 
19. Zaheer Shabir (Chair of Building the Bridge, Bristol Jamia Masjid, Immigration Lawyer) 
20. Farooq Siddique (Easton Jamia Mosque, Columnist for the Bristol Post, previously Head of 
Prevent at the Regional Government Office South West) 
21. Martyn Triggol (Detective Chief Inspector, Regional Prevent Coordinator for the South West for 
the Police) 
22. Stacey Yelland (Communications Officer at the Easton and Lawrence Hill Neighbourhood 
Management) 
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